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Climate change is disrupting the underpinnings of effective water management by
profoundly impacting hydrological patterns. Political entities mandated with freshwater
management must respond to society's water needs as availability fluctuates and, in
doing so, will encounter difficult ethical dilemmas because existing water laws are ill-
equipped to resolve such problems.
This thesis takes Chile's water laws as representative of the challenges in
addressing ethical disparities arising from freshwater management in a changing climate
and proposes that "water ethics" can effectively be used to manage freshwater resources.
I examine the 1981 Water Code with a critical eye towards ethical shortcomings and also
examine distributive impacts upon indigent farmers and indigenous communities. I
conclude that Chile's existing water laws are inequitable because they deny legitimacy to
diverse socio-cultural norms regarding water use. Principles ofmodern water laws must
incorporate diverse cultural water nonns using a legally pluralistic and ethical approach
to management.
v
VI
CURRICULUM VITAE
NAME OF AUTHOR: Michelle Platt Bassi
PLACE OF BIRTH: Tucson, Arizona
DATE OF BIRTH: December 15, 1980
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:
University of Oregon, Eugene
Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine
DEGREES AWARDED:
Master of Arts, International Studies, 2010, University of Oregon
Juris Doctorate, Law, 2010, University of Oregon
Bachelor of Arts, Art History, 2003, Bowdoin College
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:
Environmental Law
Water Resources Law
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:
Law Clerk, EarthJustice, Denver, Colorado, May-July 2009
Law Clerk, Southern Environmental Law Center, Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
June-August 2008
Research Assistant, Professor Hari Osofsky, University of Oregon, Eugene,
Oregon, May-September 2007
Research Assistant, Harvard Pilgrim Healthcare, Department of Ambulatory Care
& Prevention, Boston, Massachusetts, September 2005-July 2006
Vll
Research Assistant, Brigham & Women's Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts,
September 2005-July 2006
GRANTS, AWARDS AND HONORS:
Global Environmental Democracy Project Fellow, Environmental and Natural
Resource Law Center, University of Oregon School of Law, Eugene, Oregon,
August 2008 - May 2010
Graduate Teaching Fellowship, Hearings Officer, Office of Student Conduct and
Community Standards, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, August 2008-
June 2010
Graduate Teaching Fellowship, Department of International Studies, University of
Oregon, September 2007 - June 2008
PUBLICATIONS:
Bassi, Michelle P. "La Naturaleza 0 Pacha mama de Ecuador: What Doctrine
Should Grant Trees Standing?" Oregon Review ofInternational Law 11.2
(2009): 459-476.
YIll
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to express sincere appreciation to Professors Weiss, Hindery, and Chinn for
their assistance and support in the preparation of this thesis. I also thank the Environmental
and Natural Resource Center at the University of Oregon School ofLaw for providing me
with both support and resources to turn my ideas into a completed project. Lastly, I am
eternally indebted to Brad Bassi. Your love, support, and the sacrifices you have made
over these past four years were the keys to my success. Thank you.
IX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IMPACT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES
AND THE INEQUITABLE IMPACT ON SOCIAL SySTEMS........................... 10
Climate Change.............. 10
Impacts on Hydrological Systems 15
Inequitable Impacts on Social Systems.................................................................. 19
Implications for Law and Policy............................................................................ 21
III. WATER ETHICS: TRANSLATING THE VALUES EMBEDDED IN
FRESHWATER RESOURCES INTO AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 23
IV. CHILEAN WATER LAW 36
History and Background 36
The Chilean Constitution. 45
The 1981 Water Code............................................................................................ 47
Ownership 47
Acquiring a Water Right.................................................................................. 54
Transferring Water Rights 58
Coordinating Multiple Uses............................................................................. 59
Limitations on Water Rights 59
TheDGA 62
----------------------- ------
Chapter
Water User Associations .
Conflict Resolution .
IV. CASE STUDIES ..
The Disparate Effects of Water Resource Management: Case Studies .
Low-Income Farmers .
Indigenous Populations: Mapuche ..
Indigenous Populations: Aymara .
Common Themes .
Factoring in Climate Change ..
IV. ETHICAL ISSUES .
Water Markets '" .
Narrow Definition of Legally Cognizable Interests ..
Conflict Resolution .
Water User Associations (WUA) ..
Judicial System ..
Weak Governing Agency .
Coordinating Multiple Users and Absence of a Priority System ..
Severance of Land and Water .
Absolute Private Ownership ..
Diminished Collective Management. ..
x
Page
63
65
67
68
68
73
76
81
83
84
85
87
88
88
90
92
93
94
95
98
Chapter
Xl
Page
IV.THE RISKS OF A UNIVERSAL NORMATIVE AUTHORITY
GOVERNING FRESHWATER RESOUCE MANAGEMENT 101
Water Resource Management Discourse .. 102
The Contested Nature of Water Rights and Ethical Solutions 107
Debating a Pluralist Paradigm of Freshwater Resource Management................... 109
IV. CONCLUSION 114
Constructing an Ethical Framework 114
The Benefits Derived From an Ethical Framework 115
Concluding Remarks 117
BIBLIOGRAPHY , 119
1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Climate change will have profound impacts on global hydrological patterns and
the availability of freshwater resources, which will thereby force local, regional, national,
and international communities to reallocate freshwater resources to meet society's
demands for water. Current legal regimes that manage freshwater resources are
constructed upon the concept that water is both a stable and renewable resource and that
water availability is predictable. However, climate change will alter precipitation and
water flow patterns that will, at a minimum, exert stress on legal regimes or, at worst,
render them obsolete. Because humans have an indelible relationship with water and
water is a necessary resource for social development and stability, governments are
obligated to reform water policies to address changing hydrological conditions.
Undoubtedly, the redistribution and reallocation of water resources as a result of climate
change will be one of the most challenging and profound environmental policy agendas
that legislatures and governments will face this century given the complex legal, moral,
economic, and political issues embedded in water.
Water policy reform should be a priority even in the absence of climate change as
the demand for water is increasing given the competing water needs and uses of various
stakeholders resulting from the growing global population. Current models of natural
resource management are incapable of addressing the needs and cultural values of water
2held by the various segments of society. Consequently when there is not enough water,
water uses and rights become contested, leading to the eruption of disputes and conflicts
that place stakeholder against stakeholder. Controversy occurs not only because of
conflicting needs and demands over water but also because adversaries ascribe different
values and ethical responsibilities to water. The human relationship with water is a
complex blend of values and ethics. Water laws, which govern human behavior in
regards to water allocation and distribution, do not reflect or protect these principles.
Water laws instead divorce water from context-specific circumstances and apply a
universal approach to natural resource management. Problems with equity and access
arise under this model because a universal legal regime fails to account for "water
culture," the sociocultural values tied to specific communities and geographies. Thus in
order to reform water laws appropriately to respond to climate change, water laws need to
be reconceptualized to acknowledge and validate cultural values and ethics. I call this
new model an "ethical framework" for freshwater management.
An ethical framework is a set of policies derived from culture that promote
particular values. These values, when codified into legitimate legal authority, create a
code of ethics that "pertain to the tacit rules of behavior and consequences that regulate
people's lives, activities, and decision making.,,1 When ethics are applied specifically to
water resource management, the concept of water ethics emerges, which I define as a
theory that uses cultural values to govern the allocation, protection, and accessibility of
water. To ensure the continued existence of cultural traditions, sustainable growth and
1 Gabriel Eckstein, Precious, Worthless, or Immeasurable: The Value and Ethic ofWater, 38 TEX. TECH L.
REv 963, 967 (2005).
-----------
3
development, and societal stability in the face of climate change, I propose that legal
regimes managing freshwater resources must be reformed using an ethical framework
and governed by the concept of water ethics.
Because there is no universally agreed upon code of the ethics as the concept of
ethics is as diverse as the communities that promote them, policy reforms promoting
water ethics must naturally embrace legal pluralism. According to Rutgerd Boelens,
professor and researcher of water management, "legal pluralism provides important
insights for the understanding of water rights. Water resources...are often used and
managed under legally plural conditions, in which rules and principles of different
origins, legitimated by different legal and normative frameworks, coexist and interact.,,2
If Boelens is correct in asserting that water can be managed using a legal pluralist
paradigm, sovereignties then need to identify what segments of society do not have
legitimized water norms and incorporate those norms into a management scheme.
Developing ethical water policy reforms to account for climate change requires
several considerations such as how best to manage water in an unpredictable climate,
identifying what legal provisions will promote these goals, and ensuring that management
practices do not have disparate impacts among various stakeholders. Before offering
policy recommendations to construct an ethical framework for freshwater resource
management, defects about how current legal regimes hinder or promote a society's
water values must first be examined. This thesis addresses the foundational challenges in
2 Rutgerd Boelens, Margreet Zwarteveen & Dik Roth, Legal Complexity in the Analysis ofWater Rights
and Water Resources Management, in LIQUID RELAnONS - CONTESTED WATER RIGHTS AND LEGAL
COMPLEXITY 13 (Dik Roth et al. eds., 2005).
------- ------ ------ ---------- -------------------------
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constructing an ethical framework to manage water resources. No water ethic reform can
be constructed without first examining what legal practices are problematic and what
practices are innovative. This analysis shows that current western legal models are ill
equipped to handle the ethical dilemmas ofwater management and will only worsen as a
result ofclimate change. Analyzing models for water resource management requires
asking questions such as: what segments of society have inequitable access to water? In
times of shortage, who has access to water? How will climate change impact water
access and availability for marginalized and indigent populations? Who is participating
in making these laws? What interests are being represented? The answers to these
questions lie in both specific legal provisions and broader theories oflegislation and
cultural identity.
To frame the discussion of ethical water management and to draw conclusions
about water ethics as a discourse, I have selected Chile's 1981 Water Code as a case
study. Before outlining the specific values in using Chile's water management system as
a case study, it is first important to state that there is no one management scheme that is
representative ofhow other nations manage water resources. Every water management
scheme is a unique blend ofthe culture, politics, and is intimately tied to geography.
Take for example the two dominant models of water rights in the United States: riparian
rights and prior appropriation.3 States in the eastern United States, a region with
historically abundant water resources, employ a variation of riparian rights, which ties
water use to adjacent land. However, riparian rights were too restrictive to meet water
3 For a comprehensive history of riparianism and prior appropriation, see JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF
WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW (2004).
5demands in the western United States where water is both seasonally and geographically
scarce. Thus, western states developed the doctrine of prior appropriation, which severs
water rights from adjacent landownership and allows water to be transported and used
where it is most needed. Although U.S. states manage freshwater resources under either
of these two models, each state has adjusted the doctrine to meet the state's cultural,
political, industrial, and hydrological specificities.
Given the unique nature of each water management scheme, it is impossible to
identify one model that is entirely representative of many other models. Thus while
Chile's model does not entirely represent of how other sovereignties manage their water
resources, there are aspects ofthe Chilean Water Code that are used by other nations. For
instance, Chile's code severs water rights from landownership, which is precisely how
the prior appropriation doctrine manages water. In other words, there are legal principles
used by the Chilean Water Code that are used by other nations. These similarities make
the Chilean management scheme representative of other water management models.
I selected the Chilean model for multiple reasons. Chile's model highlights the
vast and complex types of ethical problems governments and agencies encounter with
freshwater management. Chile manages freshwater resources using a free-market
approach, a system that serves as "the leading international example of free market water
po1icies.,,4 Chile reformed its water sector in 1981 by deregulating and decentralizing
water management in order to promote a private and market orientated system, a reform
4 Victor Galaz, Stealing From the Poor? Game Theory and the Politics ofWater Markets in Chile, 13
ENVTL. POL. 414, 415 (2004).
6that has been called "the most profound reform that has ever been carried out worldwide
in this sector."s A free-market system is often advocated as the best approach to manage
diminishing freshwater resources because its inherent flexibility and treatment ofwater as
a valuable resource, and thus, it is appropriate to critique this management scheme in
light of climate change. Under the free-market model, water is treated as an economic
good and intergovernmental agencies, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and World Bank, have imposed the Chilean water model onto other developing
countries.6 Thus in choosing the Chilean model to study, I can simultaneously critique
dominant development and natural resource management practices.
Another reason I have selected Chile as the focus ofmy research is that previous
studies have examined the impact of the 1981 Water Code upon disadvantaged
populations such as indigenous communities and indigent farmers. 7 These works have
examined both the efficiency and distributive effects of water policy reform and provide
excellent empirical evidence to show that legal regimes have ethical implications.
Included in these case studies is a brief commentary about the 2009 landmark Chilean
5 Donato Romano & Michel Leporati, The Distributive Impacts ojthe Water Markets in Chile: A Case
Study in Limari Province, 1981-1997,41 Q. J. INT'LAGRIC. 1,1 (2001).
6 "The national water law and policy of Chile has been, and continues to be, considered by many one of the
world's most successful and effective water governance models. In the eighties and nineties, Peru, Bolivia,
and Ecuador, as well as many other Latin American countries, were forced by the World Bank, IMF, and
Inter-American Development Bank to adopt neoliberal water legislation, copying the Chilean model."
Rutgerd Boelens & Margreet Zwarteveen, Anomalous Water Rights and the Politics ojNormalization, in
LIQUID RELATIONS - CONTESTED WATER RIGHTS AND LEGAL COMPLEXITY 106 (Dik Roth et al. eds.,
2005).
7 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 5; Galaz, supra note 4; ROBERTR. HEARNE & K. WILLIAM EASTER, WATER
ALLOCATION AND WATER MARKETS: AN ANALYSIS OF GAINS-FROM TRADE IN CHILE (World Bank Tech.
Pap. No. 315,1995).
7Supreme Court decision that granted the Ayrnara communities of northern Chile water
rights over Agua Mineral Chusmiza, a private corporation that wanted to bottle the water
running through the Ayrnara land that has been traditionally used by the indigenous
community. The common theme running through these case studies is that Chile's
current water management raises serious equity concerns and I propose that an ethical
framework could resolve these disparities.
Examining Chile's water laws employing a critical eye for ethical deficiencies
exposes the various legal provisions that will impede the country's ability to respond to
climate change ethically. Among those dilemmas identified is the definition of water as a
private good which is the cornerstone of Chile's market-based system. Treating water as
an economic good is in direct opposition with the ethical management of water because
market forces cannot account for the social, ecological, religious, or cultural values of
water. An additional impediment to the ethical management of water is the basic
principles that form the core ofmodern water law. In this thesis I argue that a
homogenous neo-liberal approach to water resource management is capable of destroying
cultures even though the model seemingly creates equal access to water.
Identifying the ethical concerns in the Chilean water model also has implications
that extend beyond national borders. For instance, tradable water rights have long been a
favored policy recommendation for developing economies. With the advent of climate
change, which will make the world's water resources more scarce and therefore more
financially valuable, governments and development agencies will have a greater incentive
to create or expand tradable water rights. Through illustrating the ethical shortcomings of
8water as a private good under Chile's water model and shortcomings of an institutional
approach to water management, I hope to draw an analogy to the broader ethical concerns
underlying the commodification and globalization of water.
To illustrate how the Chilean water model will hinder or promote ethical water
resource management responses to climate change, I provide a brief overview of climate
change and the impacts climate change will have on hydrological systems in Chapter II.
Presenting this information first is important since climate change functions as the
underlying impetus for this thesis. Chapter III presents the concept of water ethics. A
discussion ofwater ethics is critical to understand why water management is so
complicated which in tum begins to expose the challenges governing bodies will face if
policy decisions are ethically reformed. I debate whether or not a universal water ethic is
achievable or practicable because cultures value water differently, and imposing a
universal framework runs the risk ofhomogenizing and dominating diverse users.
Additionally, I address the value of an ethical framework for water management by
concluding that an ethical paradigm promotes a legal pluralist view of water resource
management. Understanding the value of legal pluralism contributes to the development
of equitable water policy reforms and minimizes future conflicts and struggles.
Following in Chapter IV, I examine the legal provisions of Chile's Water Code. I
begin the chapter with the historical and political events that led to the 1981 Water Code,
after which I discuss the laws set forth under the Water Code. Chapter V provides
empirical evidence in the form of case studies from Chile to illustrate that the Water
Code has disparate impacts and that climate change will exacerbate these ethical
9problems. While enlightening, these case studies are discouraging as they illustrate how
water resource management impacts disadvantaged groups. However, the recent Chilean
Supreme Court decision granting the Aymara communities water rights offers a glimmer
of optimism for a more ethical approach to water management. Drawing upon the legal
analysis and case studies from the prior two chapters, Chapter VI highlights several
prominent ethical concerns in the Chilean model that focus on specific legal provisions.
Finally in Chapter VII, I analyze the broader principles of water laws that function as
barriers to achieving an ethical management of freshwater resources. This chapter
contributes to constructing ethical environmental policies that will alleviate current and
future water inequities.
There is considerable value to this research. First, this is a unique project: no
research to date has analyzed the ethical implications of legal water provisions. Thus,
this thesis provides a preliminary framework on how to examine the ethical dilemmas
embedded in legal provisions. Second, this thesis contributes to the continual
development of water ethics as a discourse. Third, this research identifies ethically
problematic legal provisions that future water policy reforms should avoid. And lastly,
this research draws analogies between Chile's market-based system and the influence
climate change will have on the possible development of an international water market,
and thus the critiques of a prescriptive approach to water management are applicable to
the privatization and globalization of water resources as well.
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CHAPTER II
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IMPACT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES
AND THE INEQUITABLE IMPACT ON SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Climate Change
Climate change may very well be the factor that catapults the world into a water
CrISIS. Even in the absence of climate change, the demands for freshwater resources are
complex, often contend with one another, and demands are increasing as population
grows. Every day users and governments struggle to solve water needs and problems.
Solutions though, often address immediate concerns and do not consider how climate
change will alter hydrological conditions. Without considering the impacts of climate
change, effective water resource management will be destabilized. To date, the typical
response to climate change has been the wait-and-see approach while the response to
water shortages has been to develop supply infrastructure such as reservoirs or
desalinifaction plants, with less focus on the demand side of the equation.8 With less
water available and the additional stress of climate change on hydrological systems,
communities and governments need to reconceptualize how to manage water, particularly
in regions where supply development is not a feasible option.
8 Jordan A. Clayton, Market-Driven Solutions to Economic, Environmental, and Social Issues Related to
Water Management in the Western USA, 1 WATER 19,21 (2009) (stating that the development of supply
infrastructure has been the U.S. response to water shortages).
11
The fundamental problem in developing policies to manage water resources that
account for climate change is that future hydrological changes will be unpredictable:
The scientific models available to forecast the range ofpossible hydrological
impacts of climate change are relatively less certain than those designed to
forecast changes in global temperatures over time...There is significant agreement
among a large number ofmodels that those changes will be significant, but more
uncertainty about the exact nature, timing, and magnitude of those changes.9
Likewise, it is difficult to accurately predict how bodies of water will respond to a change
in precipitation since catchment responses depend upon complex "physiogeographical
and hydrogeological characteristics and the amount oflake or groundwater storage in the
catchment."IO This uncertainty runs counter to the qualities of effective water resource
management which include stability, reliability, and predictability. Another scientific
underpinning of water resource planning threatened by climate change is the concept of
stationarity. II Stationarity is the idea "that natural systems fluctuate within an
unchanging envelope of variability."12 Water laws and water management models are
designed to cope with the natural fluctuation in climate and hydrology so long as
fluctuations occur within the predicted stationarity. Because of global hydrological
9 Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony ofState Water Law, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10
(2010). See also, Edwin P. Maurer, Uncertainty in Hydrologic Impacts ofClimate Change in the Sierra
Nevada, California Under Two Emission Scenarios, 82 CLIMATE CHANGE 309,310 (2007); Guiling Wang,
Agricultural Drought in a Future Climate: Results from Fifteen Global Climate Models Participating in the
IPCC Fourth Assessment, 25 CLIMATE DYNAMICS 739, 740 (2005); BRIAN DAWSON & MATT SPANNAGLE,
THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 392 (2009).
10 Zbigniew W. Kundzewicz et al., Freshwater Resources and Their Management, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REpORT INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 177 (M. L. Parry et al. eds., 2007).
[hereinafter IPCC].
11 P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationary Is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCI. 573, 537 (2008).
12 !d.
12
changes, some scientists have declared that "[s]tationarity is dead and should no longer
serve as a central, default assumption in water-resource risk assessment and planning.,,13
Another challenge in reforming water laws to account for climate change and
manage the resource ethically is that water policies must translate scientific knowledge
into functioning regulations and policies. This will require lawmakers to translate
unpredictable future climatic patterns into policy. While this legislative process will be
complex, the basic science behind climate change, however, is not complicated. Earth
experiences natural oscillations between warm and cool periods, yet earth's surface
temperature is increasing at a rate that scientists cannot explain by these natural cycles.
Over the past half-century, temperatures have probably been "the highest of any 50-year
period for the past 1,300 years.,,14 Scientists have linked this increase in temperature to
an increase in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (C02) and other greenhouse
gases. 15 Up until the beginning of the industrial revolution, the earth maintained a level
of 280 parts per million (ppm) of C02 in the atmosphere. 16 Today, C02 levels have
reached 380 ppm. I? Greenhouse gases, when not at elevated levels, naturally increase
13 Id.
14 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REpORT 2007/2008: FIGHTING
CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN ADIVIDED WORLD 31 (2007), available at:
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_200n008_EN_Complete.pdf.
15 Greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide (C02), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), and synthetic
fluorinated gases like hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. Climate Change -
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/ (last visited May 1, 2010).
16 ROBERT TRAER, DOING ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 258 (2009).
17 Climate Change - Science State ofKnowledge,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/stateofknowledge.html (last visited May 1,2010).
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earth's temperature and create a habitable climate. Increased levels of CO2 and other
greenhouse gases trap energy from the sun that is not absorbed by the earth, energy that
would have otherwise radiated back into space. With an increased concentration of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, more solar radiation is captured which in tum
elevates earth's temperature and results in an enhanced greenhouse effect.
While the production of greenhouse gases and the resulting greenhouse effect are
naturally occurring, today's unprecedented current warming period is caused by an
increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, specifically CO2• Humans have
substantially increased the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere by burning
fossil fuels, by changing land uses, such as deforestation and urbanization, and other
activities. 18 Unfortunately, reversing the warming trend is not as simple as reducing our
emission habitats. Carbon, once emitted into the atmosphere, remains there for several
. 19
centunes.
Furthermore, humans have crippled the ecosystem's natural ability to eliminate
carbon from the atmosphere. The ecosystem regulates the earth's carbon by absorbing
and releasing CO2, which is emitted into the atmosphere by a variety of means, whether
anthropogenic or naturally occurring emissions. Earth's "carbon sinks," such as soil,
vegetation, rocks, and oceans, absorb CO2• With CO2 levels now at 380 ppm, earth's
carbon sinks are being overwhelmed. As a result, carbon sinks are absorbing more
18 See, James Hansen et aI., Targeting Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 7 THE OPEN
ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 222 (2008); UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, supra note 14, at
56; TRAER, supra note 16, at 258-59.
19 Hansen, supra note 18, at 11.
14
carbon, which has serious ecological impacts for the sinks and diminishes their capacity
to absorb future C02. Carbon loading the sinks leads to their destruction through a
negative feedback loop: the more C02 emitted into the atmosphere, the less the earth can
absorb, leading to increased C02 levels and higher global temperatures, which further
reduces earth's ability to absorb C02.
A challenge in addressing climate change and one that is also true for diminishing
water resources is that they are compounding problems. Climate change is driven by a
number of factors, including population and economic growth, energy demands, social
change, and technological innovations.2o As societies continue to grow and develop, they
consume more goods, energy, and resources, which in tum increases anthropogenic
emissions and ultimately impacts hydrological patterns as global temperatures rise.
When societies expand, demands for water also increases. Yet water resources are and
will continue to become scarcer because of climate change. Sadly, this is a cycle that
shows no evidence of abatement and has become such an extensive problem that only
comprehensive reforms across the fields of development and natural resource
management can effectively decelerate this cycle.
20 Just as climate change is driven by economic activities, so too is water consumption. Take for example
agriculture. "Water consumption generally increases with income and the level of economic activity - as
economies grow, they usually use more water." DAWSON, supra note 9, at 396.
15
Impacts on Hydrological Systems
The significant impacts climate change will have on the global hydrological cycle
must be accounted for in policies governing freshwater resources?! Anticipated impacts
include, "variations in the distribution, timing, and intensity ofprecipitation events ... and
changes in the timing of seasonal water flOWS,,,22 which in tum will effect the quality and
quantity of freshwater resources. Temperature is a key determinate in predicting
precipitation as the ability of air to retain water increases with temperature.23 As global
temperatures rise, the air will retain a higher amount of moisture, which increases the
amount ofprecipitation.24 Scientists project "a potentiaI2.3°C (36.5°F) average
temperature increase and a resulting 5.2 percent average increase in precipitation by the
middle of this century.,,25 Not only will higher temperatures accelerate the hydrological
cycle by altering the atmosphere's ability to retain water, but warmer temperatures will
also increase the rate of evaporation26 and more precipitation will fall as rain rather than
snow.
27
21 This thesis only summarizes some of the many hydrological impacts of climate change. For more
information on the wider scope of climate change impacts on water resources, see, e.g., IPCC, supra note
10.
22 DAWSON, supra note 9, at 392.
23 [d. at 10.
24 Scientists predict that for every "1 degree Celsius rise in earth's mean surface temperature, global
precipitation is expected to increase by 1%." [d. at 394.
2S Adler, supra note 9, at 11; Syukuro Manabe et a1., Simulated Long-Term Changes in River Discharge
and Soil Moisture Due to Global Warming, 49 HYDROLOGICAL SCI. 625, 628, 631 (2004).
26 IPCC, supra note 10, at 176.
27 Helen Ingram, David Feldman & John M. Whitely, Water and Equity in a Chaning Climate, in WATER,
PLACE, AND EQUITY 272 (John M. Whiteley et a1. eds., 2008).
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However, increased precipitation will not be evenly distributed.28 Instead, climate
change will increase the global aggregate of precipitation, meaning that changes will
occur regionally with some areas experiencing increased rainfall while other areas may
remain unchanged, and yet others may become drier.29 In regions of anticipated heavier
precipitation, an increase in rain may lead to more floods which "can strain the capacity
of existing dams and flood control facilities, [] lead to loss oflife, disolocat[e] .. .large
populations, and [lead to] extensive damage to property and other economic resources.,,30
In regions where less rainfall is anticipated, increased temperatures will lead to higher
rates of evaporation thereby increasing aridity in many areas. 31 In arid climates water is
less capable of recharging underground aquifers and running off into rivers and streams,
which creates problems with water catchment. Thus, water shortages will be exacerbated
in these already parched environments. Additionally, "[i]ftemperatures continue to
increase, arid regions are expected to expand, increasing the size of some ofthe world's
largest deserts.,,32
Climate change will alter seasonal water flows ofmountain glaciers. At first,
snowme1ts will result in an increased flow rate, but once the glaciers and snow packs
28 GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND INTEGRATED WATER
MANAGEMENT - AN INITIAL OVERVIEW 2 (2007).
29 Adler, supra note 9, at 12 (stating "available models project that we portions ofthe globe are likely to get
wetter and that arid portions of the globe are likely to get even drier and to expand in size.").
30 Id. at 11.
31 GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP, supra note 28, at 4; Ingram, supra note 27, at 272.
32 Adler, supra note 9, at 11.
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disappear, flows will diminish during the dry summer months when glacial runoff
recharges groundwater and river systems.33 This runoff is a critical source not only to
recharge hydrological systems but also for humans, industry, and nature alike. The
Technical Committee for Global Water Partnership stated in a policy brief that "[t]he
reduction in runoff will be perhaps the most serious impact ofglobal warming on the
water environment,,34 because glacial systems serve as natural reservoirs, storing water in
colder months and slowly releasing water during warmer months. To illustrate how
serious this concern is, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates
that one-sixth of the world's population lives in river basins fed by glacier or
snowmelts.35 When these sources of water dry up, at least one-sixth of the world's
population, or maybe even more, will be without water sources.
Although this thesis does not focus on issues surrounding water quality, it is
important to note that climate change will impact water quality just as it will affect water
quantity. Even though increased temperatures will lead to more precipitation, this
additional rainfall will not result in more potable water. To the contrary, degraded water
quality will intensify water scarcity. Water degradation occurs in a number of ways, one
being an increase in water temperatures. Warmer atmospheric temperatures generate
warmer water. Warmer water contains less oxygen, a critical component in water for
33 DAWSON, supra note 9, at 395.
34 GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP, supra note 28, at 4.
35 IPCC, supra note 10, at 175.
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biodegradation,36 biota development, and other ecological processes that allow water to
self-purify.37 In regions where aridity does not impede runoff, more precipitation will
increase runoff into water bodies, although this will carry with it contaminants, toxins,
and other pollutants. In regions where there is less precipitation and runoff, water will
have a higher concentration of contaminants because there will be less water to dilute
these pollutants.
Even though the debate about climate change was considered over following
Hurricane Katrina and the 2007 publications by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, climate change literature continues to be written in the future tense since the
range of impacts have not fully materialized yet.38 Nevertheless, we only need to look to
the Himalayas to observe the impact of climate change on water needs. Time magazine
recently ran an article highlighting the severity ofthe receding Himalayan glaciers, a
story that offers readers a glimpse into the future global problems of water scarcity we
will face because of climate change.39 The high altitude glaciers of the Himalayas
function as "the water tower of Asia" because snowmelt from these glaciers feed some of
the world's "mightiest river systems" and is the source of water for 3 billion people, half
36 "Biodegradation is nature's way of recycling wastes, or breaking down organic matter into nutrients that
can be used by other organisms." Environmental Inquiry, http://ei.comell.edu/biodeg/ (last visited May 1,
2010).
37 IPCC, supra note 10, at 178.
38 The Distracting Debate Over Climate Certainty, http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com (Feb. 10,2010, 11:36
EST) (stating the debate over climate change certainty is over). For an example ofclimate change
literature discussing impacts in the future tense, see UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, supra
note 14, at 107 (stating "[t]he consequences [of climate change] will be reflected in surging inequalities
within and across countries and rising poverty.").
39 See Bryan Walsh, A River Rant Through It, TIME, Dec. 14,2009.
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the world's population.4o However, rising temperatures is causing the Himalayan
glaciers to melt quickly, widening [the] gap between water supplies and needs.41 While
societies face various problems due to this water stress, the real debate concerns the
question of survival. Even though these changes are happening in the Himalayas, they
carry a real potential for both national and international conflict,42
Inequitable Impacts on Social Systems
If this thesis was only about constructing a legal framework to best respond to the
climate change challenges discussed above, I would proceed from here to make policy
.reform suggestions. I would discuss how legal models need to be more flexible in order
to allow water transfers and how models need to incentivize greater conservation.
However, that is not what this thesis concerns as these recommendations have already
been made. What does concern this thesis is the missing human element in these
reforms. As Frances Beinecke, President of the Natural Resource Defense Council
stated, "[climate change] isn't an environmental problem. It's a humanitarian problem
global in scope.,,43 Interjecting the human element into natural resource management
policies while accounting for climate change requires ethical considerations in order to
meet and protect society's needs for water.
40 !d. at 58.
41 Id.
42 I d. at 62.
43 Id. at 63 (quoting President ofNatural Resource Defense Council Frances Beinecke).
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With climate change, ethical issues arise in two ways: (1) who is impacted the most
by climate change, and (2) how humans choose to respond to climate change.44 Just
focusing on the second point, the best means ofcontextualizing the inequities of climate
change is to point to Hurricane Katrina, which devastated New Orleans in 2005. While
this example may seem obvious and trite now from overuse, the tragedy truly epitomizes
how a community's social inequalities is a predisposition to climate change vulnerability
in that Katrina impacted individuals differently along racial and socioeconomic lines.45
However, race and wealth are only two factors that create a predisposition for climate
change vulnerability. There is ample literature identifying what segments ofthe world's
population will feel the greatest impacts of climate change.46 Gender, reliance on
climate-sensitive resources, age (the young and the old), marginalized groups, and the
poor are considered to be the most vulnerable to climate change.47 These are the same
communities that are already affected by inadequate water resources and that will be
affected further when climate change renders water scarcer. Reforming water resource
44 "How we as individuals should act in the face of the rapid anthropogenic environmental change that are
now sweeping the globe with disastrous consequences for many of our contemporaries, future generations,
and nonhuman nature is one of the most interesting and important ethical issues that climate change
confronts us. But just as important are the ethical questions that underlie our collective responses to
climate change." Dale Jamieson, Climate Change and Global Environmental Justice, in CHANGING THE
ATMOSPHERE: EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 291 (P. Edwards et al.
eds., 2001).
45 The hurricane destroyed two of the poorest communities of New Orleans where the victims of those
neighborhoods were 75% African Americans, a population that has three times the poverty rate of whites.
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, supra note 14, at 81.
46 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, supra note 14; UNESCO, WATER IN A
CHANGING WORLD (2009); MARIE-JOELLE FLUET, Luc VESCOVI & AMADOU IDRISSA BOKOYE, WATER
AND CLIMATE CHANGE: CITIZEN MOBILIZATION, ASOURCE OF SOLUTIONS (2009).
47 FLUET, supra note 46, at 74.
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management is only one part of a larger process needed to adapt to climate change, but a
very important process nonetheless. Using an ethical framework to reform water
resource management is a means of climate change adaptation that avoids reinforcing
social or cultural inequalities.
Implications for Law and Policy
The impacts climate change will have on water resources and human populations
prompt legal systems to respond proactively. This means changing the underlying
models based upon stationarity, stability, and predictability that are used in water
resource planning. Law Professor Robert Adler from the University of Utah warns,
"legal systems designed mainly to promote stability rather than to respond to rapid
change, [changing to new water laws and policies] ...will not be easy.,,48 Water resource
management needs to be governed by laws and policies that enable flexibility so that
water can be redistributed as needed. But an ethical framework would ensure flexibility
be countered by equity so that water is not forcibly taken away from marginalized users
and given to wealthier and more powerful users. New laws must permit the redistribution
of water on multiple scales (e.g. regional, national, and international) in order to
minimize human suffering and conflict. Indeed, one option to promote flexibility is to
create water markets such as those operating in Chile. This solution, however, is
incapable of accounting for the social, cultural, and environmental price ofwater. To
48 Adler, supra note 9, at 7.
ensure any water policy refonns consider these values, an ethical framework must be
incorporated into climate change policies.
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CHAPTER III
WATER ETHICS: TRANSLATING THE VALUES EMBEDDED IN FRESHWATER
RESOURCES INTO AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK
Any student, scholar, or practitioner working in the water resource field has
undoubtedly heard the saying, "[w]hiskey is for drinking; water is for fighting over.,,49 A
hackneyed quote, but nevertheless one that emphasizes the intrinsic, indisputable, and
universal value of water: water is invaluable because all life is dependent upon water.
Because water is as valuable as life itself, control over water is power. Despite the
immeasurable value of water, humans are straining water resources through development,
population growth, and now water resources are threatened by climate change. And as
the previous chapter discussed, climate change will have disparate impacts upon
disadvantaged and marginalized segments of society. These factors taken together - the
growing demand, increasing scarcity, and high inequity - are a guaranteed formula for
conflict and political, social, and economic instability. Avoiding such a disaster requires
water policy reforms to shift the current water resource management practices away from
unrestricted growth and inefficiencies, towards a process that allows those with little or
no voice to participate and have a stake in the political processes. Managing water using
49 Although unverified, this quote is usually attributed to Mark Twain. See, e.g., Mark Twain Quotations,
Newspaper Collections, & Related Resources, http://www.twainquotes.com/Water.html (last visited April
17,2010).
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an ethical framework is a means of avoiding the impending disaster climate change will
have on hydrological and social systems.
The concept ofwater ethics will help communities, agencies, and governments
reconceptualize water policy reforms to address the conflicting water needs of society.
This chapter defines water ethics, summarizes the progress of water ethics scholarship
today, and examines the value ofusing an ethical framework to reform natural resource
management. My concept of an ethical framework deviates from those policies
recommended in current literature. 50 For instance, the topic of water ethics is being
discussed as a set of universal policies. I disagree with this approach and have found
only one piece of literature supporting my proposition. 51 Few scholars challenge the
notion of a universal water ethic because they fail to recognize the meanings embedded in
water resources. This chapter discusses the various imbedded cultural values in water to
illustrate the complexity of creating a universal ethical paradigm and also the inherent
risk that a universal paradigm will homogenize the cultural differences in relation to
water. Ultimately, this chapter seeks to advance the argument that an ethical framework
is a tool that can minimize conflict over water resources in a changing climate.
Water is a precious resource, and before engaging in any meaningful critique
about water ethics, the diverse values ofwater must be discussed. When scholars discuss
the value of water, they generally use one or both ofthe following arguments. The first
50 See, e.g., Gabriel Eckstein, Precious, Worthless, or Immeasurable: The Value and Ethic ofWater, 963
TEX. TECH L. REv 38, 967 (2005); Janos J. Bogardi, Water Disasters and Ethics, in WATER ETHICS:
MARCELINO BOTIN WATER FORUM 315 (M. Ramon Llamas et al. eds., 2009).
51 See Helen Ingram, David Feldman & John M. Whitely, Water and Equity in a Changing Climate, in
WATER, PLACE, AND EQUITY 277 (John M. Whiteleyet al. eds., 2008) (explaining that the nature of water
helps "explain the failure of attempts ton construct mutually consistent principles of water ethics.").
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and most often used rationale highlights the unique nature of water. Water automatically
has value since it has "life giving and sustaining capabilities."s2 Moreover, from a
utilitarian perspective, water is valued for the countless ways it touches our lives:
recreation, navigation, energy, agriculture, industry, and the list goes on and on. The
second but less common way the value of water is discussed is to conceptualize water as
an extension of cultural identities, an approach that is more often used by social scientists
then lawyers or government agents. This perspective frames water as "a 'hybrid' thing
that captures and embodies processes that are simultaneously material, discursive and
symbolic."S3 Under this concept, the value of water is financially immeasurable as value
is derived from social, cultural, and historical customs.
The values ascribed to water ultimately depend on who is doing the assessment.
Assessments can be performed by individuals or collectively, such as by a community,
state, or nation. "Factors that can influence how water is perceived, and therefore valued,
may include: perspectives on life and the value of life itself; social and economic ideals;
cultural, religious, and societal backgrounds and proclivities; and even politics."s4
Values are often conflicting. Even where water is managed under a single management
scheme and thus one set of values is imposed upon diverse populations, water continues
to carry different importance for users that defy a single framework. Take for instance
how the different stakeholders value water in the Klamath Basin. In 2001, the U.S.
52 Amy Hardberger, Whose Job Is It Anyway?: Governmental Obligations Created by the Human Right to
Water, 41 TEX. INT'L LJ. 533, 534 (2006).
53 ERIK SWYNDGEDOUW, SOCIAL POWER AND THE URBANIZATION OF WATER: FLOWS OF POWER 28 (2004).
54 Eckstein, supra note 50, at 965.
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Bureau of Reclamation shut off water fed through the Klamath Reclamation Project, a
federal irrigation project. As the water source dried up, diverse water culture norms were
magnified between the various stakeholders including "farmers, fishing communities,
environmentalist, and Indians."ss Ultimately, the lack of sufficient water resources in
addition to competing water values led to conflict, or to what some legal scholars called,
"the clash of cultures."S6
An agreed upon set of water ethics does not exist because of the nature of water, a
nature that is either physically or socially constructed, is multifaceted and highly
complex. Thus any reference to "water ethics" is really a reference to the broader
concept of ethics, which is influenced by the beholder's set of personal and cultural
values and is then applied to water resource management. Ethics, a branch of philosophy
based on morality, "looks at the meaning...of statements about the rightness or
wrongness of actions; at motives; at blame; and fundamentally at the notion of good or
bad."S7 How we, as humans, interact and behave is internally regulated by our sense of
ethics. Ethics not only regulates human relations, but also human relations with the
55 Holly Doremus & Dan A. Tar10ck, Fish, Farms, and the Clash ofCultures in the Klamath Basin, 30
ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 287 (2003).
56 Id.
57 Magdy A. Hefny, Water Management Ethics in the Framework ofEnvironmental and General Ethics:
The Case ofIslamic Water Ethics, in WATER ETHICS: MARCELINO BOTfN WATER FORUM 26 (M. Ramon
Llamas et al. eds., 2009) (quoting Eric Katz, Ethics and Philosophy ofthe Environment: A BriefReview of
the Major Literature, 15 ENVTL. HIST. REv. 79 (1991)). Ethics has also been defmed as "codes of conduct
or prime directives that aid us in determining whether something is right or wrong, good or bad." Eckstein,
supra note 50, at 967. Likewise, Harremoes defines ethics as a "socially accepted moral standard as to
what you can do and what you cannot do (behaviour ethics) and/or a standard as what damage, pain, loss,
poverty, thirst, etc. can be inflicted upon your follow human beings (consequence ethics)." Pou1
Harremoes, Water Ethics - A Substitute for Over-Regulation ofa Scarce Resource, 45 WATER SCI. &
TECH. 113, 118 (2002).
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environment.58 However, "[e]thics has a relative meaning and it differs from one culture
to the other and one person to the other.,,59 Likewise, water ethics has a relative meaning,
which is the reason why no comprehensive definition of water ethics exists. In the book
Water, Place, and Equity, Helen Ingram similarly reasons the conflicting meaning of
water precludes a universal concept ofwater ethics:
Water can be and often is tied to place, or it can be a disembedded symbol or idea.
It can be bound up with security. It can be the focal point of community and
culture building. It can take on an essentialist character as a gift of nature. Or, it
can be an artifact of the human imagination as a matter of taste or lifestyle that
may be virtual or artificial. Many ofthese and other meaning are not
commensurable and simply cannot be ordered into any kind ofpriority that
simplifies social choices. The multiple and conflicting meanings ofwater
underlie the contemporary conflicts over the role ofmarkets, human rights,
geographically basin river-basin and watershed institutions, and participation-
based processes of inclusive governance. They also help to explain the failure of
attempts to construct mutually consistent principles of water ethics.6o
A second but subsidiary reason why no agreed upon definition ofwater ethics
exists is because water ethics scholarship is still in its infancy.61 Much ofthe literature
written on this subject fails to recognize that ethics, and therefore water ethics, are
"profoundly influenced by societal norms and belief.,,62 Failure to acknowledge this
fundamental concept of water ethics consequently has led to literature promoting water
management policies that are completely detached from the geography, history, and
58 Harremoes, supra note57, at 117.
59 Hefuy, supra note 57, at 27.
60 Ingram, supra note 51, ar 277.
61 Muhammand Mizanura Rahaman & OlIi Varis, The Ethical Perspective a/Water: Dilemmas and Future
Challenges, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF ENERGY, WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 1 (Nairn
H. Afgan et al. eds., 2005).
62 Eckstein, supra note 50, at 968.
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culture of societies. For instance, the International Conference on Water and The
Environment held in Dublin in 1992 created four guiding principles to "ethical"
management, referred to as the Dublin Principles.63 The fourth principle reads, "[w]ater
has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic
good.,,64 Yet, not all cultures would agree with this principle. For instance, framing
water as an economic good affronts the Islamic conceptualization of water as a free gift
from God.65
By disregarding the discursive, symbolic, and cultural values of water, water
ethics is able to construct a universal ethic, a "consistent principles of water ethics" to use
Ingram's language.66 One example of an attempt to construct a universal ethic are the
Dublin Principles, which proposed a management ofwater using western values to
cultures that do not conceive of water in the same manner. Pushing a universal ethic
from one paradigm, such as a western perspective, in order to reform water policies runs
the risk of homogenizing cultural values embedded in water. A handful of water ethics
literature is struggling to find common values of water between various cultures,
believing "common water ethics ... could serve as a starting point for enhancing water
resource management.,,67 This is a dangerous and implausible venture.
63 See International Conference on Water and Environment, The Dublin Statement on Water and
Sustainable Development, Dublin, Ir. 1992 [hereinafter Dublin Principles].
64 Id.
65 Eckstein, supra note 50, at 968; Harremoes, supra note 57, at 4-5.
66 Ingram, supra note 51, at 277.
67 Eckstein, supra note 50, at 970.
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Even with that said, I am willing to concede that this body of literature has
identified one universal principle. That principle is the humans right to clean and
sufficient water.68 From this ethic emerges a water management goal that believes "[w]e
should restore and maintain the integrity ofthe nation's waters, because we have a duty
to care for the ecosystems that sustain life on earth, protect the human right to
clean...water, and preserve these ecosystem functions for future generations.,,69
With the exception ofthis one principle, this thesis deviates from the body of
literature searching for a universal ethic. Aside from the few overarching truths about
water resources - all life depends on water and thus the need and demand for water will
always be present - this thesis takes the position that there cannot be a singular, universal
water ethic. Like the values and uses of water resources, ethics is a social and cultural
construct that cannot be reproduced on a global scale. Consequently, this thesis proposes
that the best way to construct an ethical framework for water management is to determine
how a community or culture values water. Identifying the needs ofdisadvantaged
communities and then exploring why these needs exist will be the basis of a water ethics
framework in this thesis.
There must be value in reconceptualizing water management under an ethical
paradigm, otherwise much literature, including this thesis, serves no purpose. Managing
water resources using an ethical framework can be easily criticized in a variety of ways.
68 See id. at 969; see also, ROBERT TRAER, DOING ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 196 (2009). But c/, Another
Bad Idea Which We Need to Act On, http://www.g10ba1waterinte1.comlinsightlanother-bad-idea-which-we-
need-act.htm1 (last visited May 1,2010) (arguing that a human right to water is a bad idea).
69 TRAER, supra note 68, at 196.
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First, ethics is an impractical concept to engineer human behavior in regards to natural
resource management. Ethics evolved without consideration for the environment,70 and
thus, ethics and resource management are incompatible discourses. Second, an ethical
management ofwater resources may not be feasible. A perspective that favors water
ethics argues that an ethical framework is a practical tool to examine the hydrological
system in a holistic manner. 71 Such a perspective means that a central principle in water
ethics is to conserve and allocate water in a way that meets the needs of all systems and
beings dependent upon water.72 Yet, the growing demand for water in addition water
scarcity caused by climate change questions the practicality ofmeeting all water needs.
If water availability enters into a crisis phase and certain water uses need to be eliminated
in order to conserve other more valuable uses, an ethical framework may not dictate the
triage of uses that will be necessary. A third argument related to the problem of
practicality is that constructing an ethical framework is a luxury since only nations with
strong economic and social security have the resources to dedicate to creating and
implementing ethical water policy reforms.
A water ethics framework can be defended against these criticisms. First, ethics
and environmental governance are not as incompatible or as disjointed as one may
believe. In fact, environmental laws are a politicized version of society's perception of
70 !d. at 4.
71 Adrian Annstrong, Viewpoint - Further Ideas Towards a Water Ethic, 2 WATER ALTERNATIVES 138,
138-39 (2009).
72 !d. at 139.
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ethics in codified fonn. Take for example, the Endangered Species Act.73 When enacted
in 1973, U.S. legislators made a definitive ethical choice to protect endangered wildlife.
Actions perceived by legislators as wrong, such as jeopardizing the existence of the
species through federally funded development projects, are prohibited by the ACt.74
Environmental laws are the means to engineer human behavior regarding natural resource
management.
Laws are not only ethical codes, but laws also function to motivate ethical
conduct. Ethical standards need to be articulated as laws for individuals who believe in
an ethical standard, but need the incentive from governing laws and regulation to behave
in a manner consistent with that ethic. For instance, hazardous waste laws exist to protect
public health and environmental well-being because waste can be toxic ifnot properly
disposed of. Individuals may choose to comply with these laws because they agree with
the ethical values promoted by these laws, that is dumping toxic waste is "bad," and
would not improperly dispose of the waste even if the laws did not exist. A second group
of actors may comply only because they fear criminal or financial liability imposed by
the laws. A third group, despite legal repercussions, fails to comply at all.
Environmental laws are significant for the second group who are individuals that may
recognize dumping waste is "bad" but still consider improperly disposing of the waste. It
is only because ofthe repercussions for their actions that these actors buy into the
nonnalized ethical behavior.
73 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2010).
74 See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (blocking the construction ofa
federally funded dam to protect the habitat of the endangered snail darter).
-------------------
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As for the feasibility concern, water ethics is no more impractical for managing
water resources then is a free-market system, religious law, or any other framework. if
water ethics is properly constructed, there is no reason as to why water uses cannot be
prioritized when water scarcity becomes a larger problem with climate change. The key
to an ethical framework, however, is that each community prioritizes their water uses in
order to respect cultural and social difference. An ethical framework does not detennine
what water nonns should prevail in prioritization. Furthennore, an ethical framework can
"address issues such as the allocation of limited water resources and its relationship to
efficiency, productivity, valuation, as well as equity and social justice.,,75 And lastly,
managing water under an ethical framework should not be considered a luxury but rather
a requisite to ensure society's longevity and stability. Governments and nations simply
need to prioritize ethical water resource management just as sovereigns must already
prioritize other legislative agendas. Additionally, sovereigns will need to refonn water
policies anyhow because climate change will disrupt the practicality and functionality of
existing water laws, and consequently, requesting governments to also consider ethical
dilemmas involving climate change and freshwater management when they refonn water
policies is not an unreasonable task.
The greatest value behind examining water ethics is that constructing an ethical
framework to address global water ethics stands as an alternative paradigm to the current
modes of natural resource management. Currently, water laws operate as a single
governing nonnative authority, which is akin to ignoring the diverse values of water. The
75 Hefny, supra note 57, at 27.
33
consequence of this regime, in the face ofclimate change and water scarcity, is social and
cultural conflict and instability. However, a truly ethical framework will prevent these
concerns because an ethical framework is a paradigm that allows for the operation of
multiple norms regarding water management. Managing freshwater resources under
various legal and quasi-legal regimes allows for a more comprehensive conceptualization
ofwater ethics because it legitimizes various social norms. Since we cannot ignore the
diverse values embedded in water, managing water from a legally pluralistic model to
address ethical resource management is the best approach. Legal pluralism as a "refers to
the existence and interaction of different (usually state and nonstate) normative orders in
the same sociopolitical space.,,76 This notion oflegal pluralism will become increasingly
clear further in this thesis when Chile's water laws and distributive impacts are examined
in case studies. Indeed, water ethics is about equity, human rights, preventing future
conflict, and even a more efficient and holistic means to managing water, but it is also
about cultural identity and the right to exist.
Managing water resources under a pluralistic framework rather then a more
inclusive, universalistic framework looks very differently. Under an egalitarian
universalistic framework that seeks to be more inclusive, the sovereign is the actor that
decides who to include in the model and what water rights or values are legitimate. Such
an approach risks erasing diversity and ultimately risks being hegemonic despite
intentions to be egalitarian. Legal pluralism, on the other hand, does not "answer the
76 Rutgerd Boelens, Margreet Zwarteveen & Dik Roth, Legal Complexity in the Analysis ofWater Rights
and Water Resource Management, in LIQUID RELAnONS - CONTESTED WATER RIGHTS AND LEGAL
COMPLEXITY 4-5 (Dik Roth et al. eds., 2005).
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question of who gets to decide.',77 Rather, a pluralistic approach "help[s] create ... shared
social space, procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices for managing
hybridity."n The policy differences of the pluralistic model creates a scheme that
promotes the goal of conservation and resource stewardship by investing personal
responsibility into natural resource management. Even though Aldo Leopold did not
discuss legal pluralism, his perspective very much resonates with the goals and objectives
of water ethics and legal pluralism:
We abuse the land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When
we see land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love
and respect. There is no other way for land to survive the impact of mechanized
man, nor for us to reap from it the aesthetic harvest it is capable, under science, of
contributing to culture. That land is a community is the basic concept of ecology,
but that land is to be loved and respected is an extension of ethics. That land
yields a cultural harvest is a fact long known but latterly often forgotten. 79
Using Leopold's philosophy, I propose that investing responsibility to manage water
resources in the hands of communities will lead to sound management decisions as that
community will ultimately be responsible for and effected by wasteful management
practices.
Arguably, a pluralist framework is not consistent with the goals of water
conservation since a pluralist framework seems to promote the water needs and demands
of all cultural norms. Yes, there are certain cultural norms that are inefficient. Toilets
77 Paul SchiffBennan, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 1155, 1165 (2007).
78 Id. at 1193.
79 ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 6 (1949).
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are perhaps the best example ofa wasteful cultural norm.80 There might also be cultural
practices that are just as inefficient that need to done away with. The goal ofwater
conservation is upheld under a pluralist framework though because the culture or
community is able to adjust water needs within that setting without having to overcome
great legal barriers. Just as common law is a legal tool that allows societies to
organically adapt and change over time, so too is legal pluralism except the difference is
that the community, rather then the sovereignty, decides that a change in water practices
is appropriate or necessary.
In recognizing the complex, conflicting, and plural values ofwater in every
community, this thesis proposes that legal pluralism is an alternative benefit ofwater
ethics, a benefit that has been unrecognized by the existing water ethics literature. This
perspective of water ethics generates water policies that not only respects diverse
relationships between water and socio-cultural norms, but also accommodates the basic
need for water. As it will become more evident further into this thesis, current water law
models are ill equipped to address the ethical dilemmas that will arise from climate
change because these models homogenize water values, thereby excluding certain
populations and creating equity issues among these communities.
80 See ROBERT GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA'S WATER CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 206
(2009).
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CHAPTER IV
CHILEAN WATER LAW
History and Background
Chile's legal system follows a civil-law tradition.8 ! There are fundamental
differences between a civil law and a common law system, which ultimately influences
what legal authority policymakers must analyze and how policymakers will reform water
laws. In this chapter, I clarify where to locate water laws in a civil law system for those
readers more familiar with legal research in a common law system and provide some
basic guidance on the legislative reform process. A civil law system is "code based" and
judges follow these legal rules rather then interpreting the law, as is the practice in
common law jurisdictions. Consequently, this thesis will mostly analyze codes rather
then judicial opinions and court cases, which would have been the approach had water
laws originating from a common-law system been analyzed.
The Chilean legislature, which is called the National Congress, consists of a
Senate and a Chamber ofDeputies.82 Laws passed by the National Congress follow a
81 Civil law, which originates from the Roman Empire, is a legal system that is code-based and the judges
impose predetennined rules rather then interpret the law. JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, A
PRIMER ON THE CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM I (1995). For a brief history on the development of the civil law
system in Chile, see id. at 16-18.
82 Essential Issues ofthe Chilean Legal System, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Chile.htm (last
visited May I, 2010).
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hierarchical system of institutional acts, special acts, and then ordinary acts.83 Within this
latter category, a subcategory oflaws exists that are called decree or delegated laws
(D.F.L. or Decreta can Fuerza de Ley).84 Delegated laws are legislated by the President
of Chile through the delegated powers ofCongress, the authority for which is
constitutionally enumerated. 85 The Chilean Water Code is a delegated law. Even though
delegated laws are created by Presidential decree, the executive branch cannot amend or
repeal the law. Rather, in order to repeal or amend a delegated law, the legislative branch
has to legislate a new statutory provision.86 Although the Water Code is a delegated law
and would seemingly follow this process ofreform, amending the Water Code actually
requires more. Given the close relationship between Chile's Constitution and the Water
Code,8? both legislative chambers of the National Congress would have to approve a
83 This hierarchy denotes that different percentages of legislative approval are necessary to pass different
types oflaw. See id.
84 Id.
85 The power of the President to legislate decrees with the force of law is enumerated in Article 61 of the
Chilean Constitution. See CONST. CHILE art. 61. The Constitution prohibits the President from enacting
D.F.L. relating to "nationality, citizenship, elections or plebiscite, [or] to matters covered by the
constitutional guarantees or which must be a matter of the constitutional organic laws or of laws passed by
a qualified quorum. The authorization may not include powers that affect the organization, powers and the
legal system of the officers of the Judiciary, the National Congress, the Constitutional Court or the Office
of the Comptroller General of the Republic." Id.
86 Humberto Nogueira Alacalli, La Delegacion de Facultades Legislativas en el Ordenamiento Juridico
Chileno, 2010, http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0718-00122001000200005&script=sci_arttext (last
visited May 1, 2010).
87 See infra pp. 44-47 (discussing that the Constitution is the source of authority and model for Chile's
Water Code).
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statutory refonn to the Water Code by a three-fifths vote.88 This presents an obvious
challenge to water policy refonn in Chile.
Courts in civil law and common law countries share some similarities. For
instance in Chile, the courts are independent from the executive and legislative branches
of government.89 The judicial system is a hierarchy divided into three tiers with the
Supreme Court at the top, followed by Courts ofAppeals, and then tribunals offirst
instances. Chile has two specialized courts - the Constitutional and Electoral Courts -
which are independent of the Supreme Court's judicial reviews.9o If water law cases are
adjudicated in the judicial system, cases will first go before a judge sitting in a lower
level civil court. Civil law and common law courts are different in that judges in civil
law systems do not interpret Chilean law. Consequently, judicial opinions do not carry
precedence and thus take on a different style then judicial opinions written in a common-
law system. The judiciary instead functions to strictly enforce Chile's laws. 91
Chile's freshwater resources are managed by three sources: the 1980 Chilean
Constitution, the 1981 Water Code, and a handful of statutes supplementing the Water
Code.92 Before delving into a textual analysis of these sources, we must first take heed of
88 Essential Issues ofthe Chilean Legal System, supra note 82 (stating that "[1]aws that interpret the
Constitution require approval from three-fifths of both legislative chamber.").
89 !d.
90 Id.
91 Joe Mentor, Trading Water, Trading Paces: Water Marketing in Chile and the Western United States,
AMERICAN WATER RESOURCE ASSOCIATION 3,
http://www.awra.org/proceedings/dundeeO IlDocumentslMentor.pdf.
92 See, e.g., Norma de Emision Para la Regulacion de Contaminates Asociados a las Descargas de Residuos
Liquidos a Aquas Marinas y Continentales Superficiales (Directo N° 90, 2001); Establece Norma de
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Chile's political and economic history in order to comprehend fully how it came to be
that Chile manages water under a free market system. Chile's Water Code is an example
of what one scholar calls "the law of the pendulum," which is the tendency of laws to
shift from one extreme to the other without ever settling on a middle ground.93 One
extreme ofthis pendulum was the 1967 Water Code, the code prior to the 1981 Water
Code. Under this code, the Chilean government largely regulated and managed the
nation's waters and prohibited private ownership of water rights. In reaction to big
government and limited private rights, the pendulum swung in the opposite direction
when the 1981 Water Code redefined water rights as private property and restrained the
government's authority to regulate freshwater management. As evident from the little
information provided about these two models, the Chilean Water Codes have been
enumerated as a reaction to socio-political pressures rather than a model designed to
coincide with hydrological realities, a fact alone that indicates the current code is not
equipped to address the ethical challenges emanating from climate change.
The political indecisiveness over freshwater resource management began prior to
the 1967 Water Code with Chile's first Water Code, which was enacted in 1951. The
1951 code was the closest model to balancing the private versus public water rights
tension that has driven all subsequent water law reform. The 1951 model has been
Emisi6n de Residuos Liquidos a Aguas Subtemmeas (Directo N° 46, 2003); Crea la Comision Nacional de
Riego (Ley N° 19.604, 1983); Reglamenta Procedimiento Para Aplicacion del D.F.L. 1.123/81, Sobre
Ejecucion de Obras Riego por el Estado (Directo N° 285, 1995); Reglamento do los Servicios de Agua
Destinados al Consumo Humano (Decreto N° 735, 2007).
93 CARL J. BAUER, SIREN SONG: CHILEAN WATER LAW AS A MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL REFORM 31
(2004).
40
analogized to the prior appropriation model of freshwater management, which is the
model used in the western United States.94 This version ofthe Water Code was heavily
influenced by the prominent development theory of the 1950s, which promoted very
active governments in order to stimulate economic development. Consequently, the
government played a large role in managing water use under the 1951 Water Code.
However, beginning in the 1950s and extending into the 1960s, Chile experienced high
inflation and little economic growth. In an attempt to stabilize the country, particularly
the agricultural sector, the government passed the Agrarian Reform Law of 1967 under
the leadership of President Eduardo Frei Motalava.95 This land redistribution scheme had
profound impacts on Chile's management of freshwater resources since land reform
requires the redistribution of water rights as well. Consequently, a new water code was
enacted in 1967, which was a response to political and economic failures of the 1951
Water Code. Under the 1967 Water Code, all private ownership of water was eradicated,
all ofthe nation's water was declared to be "national property for public use," and the
. government was given extensive regulatory power.96
There was then a dramatic political shift in the 1970s, which led to the pendulum
swinging back in the opposite direction in the early 1980s. Chile, following the
presidency of Frei, was a politically polarized nation. In 1970, Salvador Allende was
elected president and proceeded to carry out his socialist platform and nationalized
94 BAUER, supra note 93, at 37.
95 For more information on the agrarian reform under President Frei, see Joseph R. Thome, Expropriation
in Chile Under the Frei Agrarain Reform, 19 AM. J. COMPo L. 489 (1971).
96 BAUER, supra note 93, at 39-40.
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Chile's natural resources.97 His natural resources policies sparked domestic and
international opposition from elites and international corporations because the policies
aimed to improve life for the working class and failed to honor obligations made by the
prior administration. Under Allende's policies, Chile's economy grew for a short period
but then Chile plunged into a period of economic downturn, strikes, violence and
militarization.98
In 1973, Chile became the stage for a battle over wealth, power, and control of
natural resources when armed forces overthrew the government ofPopular Unity and
General Augusto Pinochet became Chile's President.99 Under Pinochet's dictatorship,
the military government began implementing neo-liberal economic policies that
embraced development through unregulated free markets. These neo-liberal policies
were implemented by a group of Chilean economists called the "Chicago Boys," a name
given to the economists because they were trained at the University of Chicago. 100 The
Chicago Boys' economic philosophy is best summarized by Milton Friedman, an
American economist who taught at the University of Chicago and opposed the Keynesian
economic model: "Chicago stands for belief in the efficacy of the free market as a means
oforganizing resources, for skepticism about government intervention into economic
97 David Carruthers, Environmental Politics in Chile: Legacies ofDictatorship and Democracy, 22 THIRD
WORLDQ. 343, 344 (2001); MARKFALCOFF, MODERN CHILE 1970-1989: A CRITICAL HISTORY 181 (1989).
98 Carruthers, supra note 97, at 345; FALCOFF, supra note 97, at 57-72.
99 Carruthers, supra note 97, at 345. For more information discussing the role of natural resources and the
involvement of the United States in Chile's political economy and political history, see FALCOFF, supra
note 97.
100 See BAUER, supra note 93, at 42.
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affairs, and for the emphasis on the quality ofmoney as a key factor in producing
inflation."IOI It was this philosophy that influenced the Chicago Boys to structurally
reform Chile's land and water rights.
Since land and water were expropriated during the 1960s, wherein the
government took away individual private property rights, the Pinochet government had to
redistribute water rights and land. Thus, beginning in 1975, the government distributed
both land and water rights to privatize freshwater resources and establish tradable
rightS. 102 Even though national policies favored free markets and private property during
the 1970s, the Chilean Water Code was not reformed until 1981. This delay in legal
reform meant that the state-centered 1967 Water Code was in effect even after the
country had shifted economic policies following Pinochet's military coup. 103
Consequently, the 1970s was a decade where legal rights were incompatible with the
country's economic and political practices, which resulted in uncertain and insecure
water rights that led to the continued muddled legal ownership of water to this day.
When the 1981 Water Code was enacted, the new model was a direct and strong
reaction to the policies established by the 1967 Water Code. The 1981 code, analyzed in
detail below, has as its underlying objectives the priorities ofthe Pinochet government.
101 JUAN GABRIEL VALDES, PINOCHET'S ECONOMISTS: THE CHICAGO SCHOOL IN CHILE 66 (1995) (quoting
Milton Friedman).
102 Mark W. Rosegrant & Renato Gazmuri S., Reforming Water Allocation Policy Through Markets in
Tradable Water Rights: Lessons From Chile, Mexico, and California, 32 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMIA 291,
299 (1995).
103 BAUER, supra note 93, at 41.
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As such, there were no ethical, hydrological104 or ecological considerations, resulting in a
code absent of these concepts. The Pinochet government perceived the 1967 Water Code
as "statist and an obstacle for private investment not only in irrigation but also in mining
and hydroelectric energy, the main source of electric energy in Chile."I05 Consequently,
freshwater management was reformed "[f]irst, to clarify and stabilize the water rights
situation within the agricultural sector, and second, to establish the legal framework to
allow the free trading of water rights, both within agriculture and from one economic
sector to another."I06 Generally speaking, these broad policy goals translated into a
laissez faire framework for managing riparian basins using extensive private property
rights and severely restricted government regulation.
What is dramatic and critical about the 1981 Water Code is that the reform
represents a considerable departure from Chile's previous water policies. The 1981 code
has been called "the most far-reaching neoliberal water reform policy,,107 and signals the
first free market approach to water management. Implementation of this system was
possible only because of the political dynamics occurring in Chile at the time:
104 I use the word "hydrological" in this sentence to capture that the Water Code does not conjunctively
manage groundwater and surface water even though these two systems are hydrologically connected.
105 Eduardo Zegarra, Water Market and Coordination Failures: The Case of the Limari
Valley in Chile 26 (July 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file
with author).
106 BAUER, supra note 93, at 98.
107 Rutgerd Boelens & Margreet Zwarteveen, Anomalous Water Rights and the Politics ojNormalization:
Collective Water Control and Privatization Policies in the Andean Region, in LIQUID RELATIONS:
CONTESTED WATER RIGHTS AND LEGAL COMPLEXITY 107 (Dik Roth et al. eds., 2005).
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It is no coincidence that the most far-reaching neoliberal water reform policy,
claiming individual freedom for all, was experimented with and implemented
under the Pinochet regime, one ofthe most repressive dictatorships the Andean
countries have ever known. Only this authoritarian and repressive regime was
able to create the necessary conditions for making the model come true, by
silencing and coercivel~ controlling water user communities' voices of protest
and acts of resistance.! 8
Minor amendments were made to the 1981 Water Code in 2005, but the code is still
largely in effect despite the country's political shift back to a democracy in the 1990s.109
Carl Bauer, an expert on Chile's water system, remarked that the 2005 reforms were not
significant and instead were twelve years of work to "get a pretty limited result."uo
Two important considerations for this thesis may be drawn from Chile's history of
freshwater management. The first is that although certain aspects of the current water
model established under a neoliberal regime are disengaged from democratic ideologies
at force in Chile today, reforms have been difficult given the country's political makeup.
The second is that Chilean water laws were created without any social or environmental
considerations, thus climate change will likely have disparate impacts within these
sectors.
108 Id.
109 "The 2005 amendments were not a comprehensive reform of the 1981 Water Code. Rather the 2005
amendments "sought to correct earlier problems and to address social equity and environmental
sustainability concerns that were largely absent form the 1981 legislation." Claus Aagaard & Helle Munk
Ravnborg, Water Reform - Implications for Rural Poor People's Access to Water, DANISH INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.diis.dk/sw25932.asp.
110 Benjamin Witte, A Candid Look at Chile's Controversial Water Market, THE PATAGONIA TIMES, April
29,2009, http://patagoniatimes.cl.
45
The Chilean Constitution
The Chilean Constitution is both the source of authority and the model for the
1981 Water Code. The Constitution was drafted by the Pinochet military regime during
the 1970s "without public discussion or opposition, at a time when the absolute political
control of the military was accompanied by the ideological ascendance of the
government's neoliberal economists."lll Like the 1981 Water Code, the 1980
Constitution is still largely in effect even though Chile transitioned back to a democracy
in the 1990s.
There is much criticism, both Chilean and foreign, about the anti-democratic
features of Chile's Constitution and the contradictions between democratic principles and
authoritarian application. ll2 However, there is very little criticism in regards to the
Constitution's expansive private property rights, which is the cornerstone of Chile's free
market water management system. The Constitution does not explicitly require a market
economy, rather establishes the necessary procedural conditions in order to facilitate a
functioning market economy. 113 For instance, the constitutional language establishes an
expansive and absolute right in private property by stating that "[i]n no case may anyone
be deprived of his property.,,114 The Constitution then grants citizens the right to
privately own water as property: "[t]he rights of private citizens over waters, recognized
111 BAUER,supra note 93, at 35.
112 See, e.g., Mark Ensa1aco, In With the New, Out with the Old? The Democratising Impact of
Constitutional Reform in Chile, 26 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 409 (1994).
113 Carl 1. Bauer, Slippery Property Rights: Multiple Uses and the Neoliberal Model in Chile, 38 NAT.
RESOURCES 1. 109, 114 (1998).
114 CONST. CHILE art. 19, § 24.
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or constituted in confonnity with the law, shall grant proprietorship to the owners
thereof."115 Because a free market system requires a functioning process of exchanges, a
water rights market cannot exist ifbuyers are unsure about a right because buyers will not
choose to invest in an uncertain good. Thus, enumerating private property rights
incentives exchange in the free market because secure ownership enables goods to be
traded according to the highest bidder.
There is legal significance to enumerating water rights as private property within
the Constitution rather than within legislation. Any refonn to Chile's water rights would
require a constitutional amendment, a very difficult process that requires broad political
SUpport. 116 Legislative refonn on the other hand, albeit a process with its own set of
barriers, does not match the hurdles required for constitutional refonn.
Consequently, the 1980 Constitution has created an enduring legacy of strong
private water rights that will hinder any refonn focused on reestablishing greater public
management of freshwater resources. Fonner Chilean President Michelle Bache1et
115 Id.
116 The requirements to pass a constitutional amendment make the likelihood of constitutional reform
unlikely.
The Constitution may be totally or partially amended... [Chile's] Constitution is called a "rigid"
one, based on the demanding proceeds to modify. The necessity of reform must be declared by
Congress [sic] with the vote of at least two-thirds of the members, but it shall not be carried out
except by an Assembly summoned to that effect. Amendments to the Constitution consist of
changes to the constitutional text, of a large or small scope, making additions, deletions, or even
alterations. The Constitution may be amended on the proposal of one of the members of the
Chamber of Deputies or of the Senate, or the President of the Republic, depending of the matter.
Such amendments must respect certain fundamental principles: direct, secret, universal, and
periodic vote; individual rights and guarantees; and separation ofpowers. Approval requires two
readings in each House of the National Congress, with three-fifths or two-thirds of the votes of the
respective members.
Essential Issues ofChilean Legal System, supra note 82.
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submitted a proposal to constitutionally reform Chile's Water code to Congress on
January 6, 20 I0. 117 The proposal, which was presented as urgent, would have defined
water as national property for public use and would also have established limits and
obligations on water rights. I 18 Both the private sector and right-wing politicians
vehemently opposed the proposal and just three days before President Bachelet left
office, the lower house removed the proposal's urgency status and an official from the
Public Works Ministry subsequently announced constitutional water reforms would not
be a priority in 2010. 119
The 1981 Water Code
Ownership
One of the essential components ofmanaging water resources is to define the
ownership of water, which determines who ultimately has control over water resources.
The question ofownership is different from the right to use water, which is the right to
use water within a set of pre-established conditions. Cultural definitions ofwho owns
117 Eva Medalla, Constitutional Reform to Update Water Code is Not a Priority, Bus. NEWS AM., April 6,
2010,
http://www.bnamericas.com/news/waterandwaste/ConstitutionaIJeform_to_update_water_code_is_not_a_
priority_-_MOPI.
liS The proposal also would have made "water a national resource for public use and includes water in its
liquid, solid - including glaciers and snow - and gaseous states." /d. I introduce this portion of the
proposal as it likely had interesting reasons for being drafted, such as an attempt by the government to
tightly regulate water sources as water resources availability diminishes.
119/d.
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water varies widely, but generally speaking, legal ownership of water may be defined as
"public, private, common, of nobody, or community.,,12o Additionally, a legal regime
might define water as a mix of these concepts since a system that is purely one type of
ownership may fail in optimizing water usage and needs. Under a legal regime that
manages water as a public good, water belongs to the state or can be held in trust by the
state. Water rights, then, are usufructuary rights, wherein use by private individuals is
allowed but the rights are not permanent or absolute and the state ultimately can recall the
water right. Private ownership of water, on the other hand, is inalienable and individuals
can own water and manage water in the same way that an individual may own or use
private property.
Water in Chile can be privately owned, a right derived from the Constitution. 121
Although the Constitution is quite clear that water may be treated as private property, the
1981 Water Code contains contradicting language that describes water as public and
national property even though water is treated as a private good. According to the 1981
Water Code, water is defined as bienes nacionales de uso publico, or "national property
for public use.,,122 This language "dates back to the 1850s, when Chile adopted its Civil
Code, which is still in effect.,,123 When Chile's Civil Code was drafted in the 1850s, the
code's primary author Andres Bello drew [from] a number of sources... ofwhich the
120 DANTE A. CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 138 (2007).
121 See CONST. CHILE art. 19, § 24.
122 Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, art. 5 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122).
123 CARL J. BAUER, supra note 93, at 37.
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most prominent were Roman law (primarily from the Corpus Juris Civilis), Spanish law
(including the Codigo de Las Siete Partidas and the glosses on that work by later Spanish
jurists), the Code Civil of France, other European civil codes (including those of Prussia
and Austria), and the treatises and scholarly writings of Spanish and French jurists."124
The resulting concept of property law was one that frames property as a social function
and a right that can be restricted by the state. 125 Although the civil-law idea of ownership
is explicit in Chile's codes, the language is no more then a hangover from Chile's first
Civil Code of 1857. To circumvent civil-law concepts of property, the government has
enacted much legislation, "restricting the exercise of the right ofproperty in such a way
as almost to do away with the classic attributes of ownership set forth in the Civil
Code.,,126
Consequently, even though the Water Code defines water as a "national property
for public use" which sounds like a grant of public ownership over water, the code
quickly curtails this interpretation of water as public property in the next provision, which
states that the national government can grant private rights to water, a right called
derechos de aprovechamiento or the "rights of advantageous use.,,127
Private ownership established by the Chilean Water Code creates an absolute and
exclusive possession over water that is not part of other nation's legal or cultural
124 APPLE, supra note 81, at 17; see also Juan G. Matus Valencia, The Centenary ofthe Chilean Civil Code,
7 AM. J. COMPARATIVE L. 71,76-77 (I958)(describing influences on Chilean Civil Code).
125 Valencia, supra note 124, at 81.
126 Id.
127Id. arts. 5 & 6; BAUER, supra note 93, at 32.
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vocabulary. Private ownership creates a number of subsidiary rights as well, many of
which may be perceived as significant or radical to those whose freshwater resource
management policies derive from a socialist or ecocentric perspective. Contrast for
instance, private ownership of water in the western United States to that of Chile. In the
western United States, private rights are akin to an usufructuary right, which allows the
owner enjoys the benefits of water ownership but the rights may be routinely changed,
monitored, and limited. In Chile though, the owner yields unlimited rights and can use
the water for any purpose. 128 Owners are free to alter the type or method of their water
use without having to seek administrative or governmental approval first. 129
This right includes the ability to "freely change the location and use of water
rights without [governmental agency] approval.,,130 Furthermore, an owner will not lose
their right if the water is not effectively used. 131 Interestingly, this is provision is a
unique characteristic of the Chilean water model as no other model in the world has this
provision. 132 Likewise, owners do not relinquish portions of their water rights ifother
users benefit from unused portions of another's water right. Since not all water users will
128 "El que goza de un derecho de aprovechamiento puede hacer, a su costa, las obras indispensables para
ejercitarlo." Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, art. 9 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122); "El
derecho de aprovechamiento es un derecho real." Id. art. 6 (describing the water right as a real right).
129 BAUER, supra note (92), at 33. The one exception to this rule is if the owner is seeking to change the
location of diversions from a natural channel.
130 Bauer, supra note (107), at 121.
131 AxEL DOUROJEANNI & ANDREI JOURAVLEV, ELCODIGO DE AGUAS DE CHILE: ENTRE LA
IDEOLOGIA y LA REALIDAD 153 (1999).
132 Id. (stating, "[t]ampoco es necesario que los titulares de derechos de agua utilicen efectivamente los
caudales a que tienen derecho 0 construyan las obras necesarias para hacerlo. Estas caracteristicas del
C6digo de Aguas son (micas en el mundo.").
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entirely consume a water right, water may reenter a hydrological system as "return flow."
"Return flows occur because some portion of the water extracted by a certain user is not
completely consumed and actually returns to the river at some point located
downstream."l33 Return flows are a critical source of water since unused and returned
water from an upstream rights-holder may contribute or even entirely compose of a
downstream user's water right. In Chile, "[r]eturn flows are made available to water
users at no charge, but no rights are established to these flows. Changes in patterns of
return flows due to trades are therefore not actionable.,,134
Since water is physically attached to land, definitions of ownership need to
address whether water can be owned with or without corresponding land ownership. In
Chile, water ownership is independent from land ownership,135 meaning water rights
have been severed from land ownership. Severance of land and water rights has several
important implications. First, water rights holders can access water even if the water runs
on another's private property. Second, this allows water to be collected and transported
elsewhere. 136 Third, severance increases the scope of who may own the water, as well as
diversifies the possibilities of how the water is used.
133 MONICA Rios BREHM & JORGE QUIROZ, THE MARKET FOR WATER RIGHTS IN CHILE: MAJOR ISSUES 19
(1995).
134 Rosegrant, supra note 102, at 302.
135 Cf riparianism, which is "a doctrine of ancient origin that defines water rights in terms of use of water
in association with ownership of land. The traditional riparian right to use water is, in an important sense,
derivative of ownership ofland." JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 27 (West 2006) (1986).
136 "Asi, el que tiene derecho a sacar agua de una fuente situada en la heredad vecina, tiene el derecho de
transito para ir a ella, aunque no se haya establecido en el titulo." Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, art. 8
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The scope of ownership is defined in very specific tenns. Water rights "are
proportional rights (shares) over a variable flow or quantity; deeds stipulate that an owner
has the right to a certain number of shares at a certain location. These rights are
expressed in volume by unit oftime (liters per second or cubic meters per year or month)
and are proportional if supply is insufficient.,,137 From a general policy perspective,
defining the tenns of ownership, such as how much and from where water can be
withdrawn, enables governing bodies to monitor users, to gauge how much or if any
water is left in the system to allocate, and allows an agency to coordinate multiple users
on the same hydrological system.
Not only does the Water Code specify how much and from where a water right
may be withdrawn, but it classifies this right using three categories. Article 12 of the
Water Code defines water as: (1) consumptive or non-consumptive; (2) pennaent or
contigent; and (3) continuous, discontiunous, or alternating. 138 Under the first category,
every water use is defined as either consumptive or non-consumptive. A consumptive
use is a "right that does not require that the water be returned after being used, and the
owner of this right may totally consume the water in any activity.,,139 A non-
consumptive use, on the other hand, grants the owner the right to use the water, but the
(Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122); see generally, STEPHEN HODGSON, LAND AND WATER - THE
RIGHTS INTERFACE (2004).
137 Rosegrant, supra note 102, at 300.
138 See, Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, art. 12 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122).
139 Guillermo Donoso, Water Markets: Case Study ofChile's 1981 Water Code, 33 CIENCIA E
INVESTIGACION AGRARIA 157, 160 (2006); see also, Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, art. 13 (Decreto con
Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122).
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water must be restored unaltered. 140 The provision establishing non-consumptive use
rights was a new addition in the 1981 Water Code to respond to Chile's energy demands.
By allowing an owner to "divert water from a stream or river and use that water to
generate hydroelectric power," 141 the code intended to stimulate the development of
hydroelectricity without harming downstream irrigators.
Water rights are defined under the second category as permanent or contingent,
classifications that are conditions based upon the availability of water resources.
Permanent uses "[a]re rights to use water in specified amounts, unless the source of
supply contains insufficient amounts to meet these needs fully, in which case the flow
shall be distributed in equal parts.,,142 Contingent uses "[a]re those that only authorize
the user to utilize the water at times when the original flow of water is more than
sufficient to satisfy permanent rightS.,,143
Lastly, water uses are either defined as continuous, discontiunous, or alternating,
designations that dictate when an owner may utilize their water right. 144 Continuous uses
"[a]re those that permit the use of water in a constant manner, 24 hours a day. In other
words, the right can be exercised during the entire day, every day of the year.,,145 For
140 Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, art. 14 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122).
141 BAUER, supra note 93, at 103.
142 Donoso, supra note 139, at 160.
143/d.
144 Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, art. 19 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122).
145 Donoso, supra note 139, at 160.
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example, "[d]rinking water rights ...are distributed continuously throughout the year.,,146
Discontinuous uses "[a]re those that only permit water to be used during given periods.
In other words, they can only be exercised in periods and at time defined in the title.,,147
Water used for irrigation is an example of a discontinuous use right. "Irrigation rights are
associated with a distribution of water volume throughout the year, with variations
similar to the variation in irrigation needs for a typical crop.,,148 Finally, alternating uses,
which are rights "in which the use of water is distributed among two or more persons
who use the water successively.,,149
Acquring a Water Right
The right to use water proceeds from ownership. Those seeking to obtain a water
right must go through the prescribed procedures for acquiring a right. There are a
number of procedures that governing bodies may impose to regulate and systemize the
process of obtaining a water right. What procedures are required to obtain a right has
profound influence on who can become rights holders. For instance, in Chile there is no
application fee to request a water right from the government, which means individuals
from any socioeconomic background can request a water right. However, if an individual
146 Id. at 165.
147 Id. at 160.
148 Id. at 165.
149 Id. at 160.
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wants to buy or lease a right from a water rights holder, then this requires money and
therefore, certain segments of the population without financial resources will be excluded
from participating in the water market. Additionally, requiring applicants to obtain a
water right through a regulated procedure allows the governing body to register water
rights, which in turn legitimizes those rights and protects the holder's interest if the right
is ever encroached upon.
Whereas certain application processes for water rights can be a long and
bureaucratic, the process for a new water right in Chile is stripped ofprocedural
complications and heavy government regulation. Essentially, the process to acquire a
new water right is a rubber stamp process. The requirements for a new water right are
few and can be easily met, which raises conservation and ethical concerns. When an
individual or corporation applies for a water right, the appliation only needs to name
where the water is going to be withdrawn from, the amount to be withdrawn, how the
water will be removed, and how the water should be categorized (i.e. consumptive or
non-consumptive).150 Applications do not require any justifications or specifics as to
how the water will be used nor are applications conditional on the type ofuse. 151
Applications are processed by the Dirrecion General de Aguas ("DGA"), Chile's
state water rights agency. If water is available, the DGA does not have the authority to
deny the request. In addition, the DGA does not have the authority to decide among
competing applications ifmore then one application makes a request for overlapping
150 Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, art. 140 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122).
151 Victor Galaz, Stealing From the Poor? Game Theory and the Politics ofWater Markets in Chile, 13
ENVTL. POL. 414, 416 (2004).
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uses.
152 In fact, if an applicant meets the requirements for a new water right, the DGA
"may not refuse to grant new water rights without infringing a constitutional
guarantee.,,153 In order to address environmental sustainability concerns created by the
1981 Water Code, the 2005 reforms bestowed the DGA with authority to consider
environmental aspects in establishing new water rights. 154 However, this provision did
not to alter the rubber stamp process for acquiring a water right and without evidence
illustrating otherwise, this language was likely inserted in the code to appease political
groups and constituents concerned about environmental issues. Essentially, the only
limitation in acquiring a water right is whether or not water is available for ownership.
Applications for a right that will or may affect a third party interests have an
additional step in obtaining approval. Applicants must publish their filing in the Diario
Oficial, a daily Santiago newspaper, and in an appropriate regional newspaper. 155
Affected parties only have 30 days to respond to the publication by notifying the DGA I56
The DGA is then responsible for resolving the conflict, a process that is funded by the
affected third party.157 Decisions reached by the DGA can be appealed to a Court of
152 Bauer, supra note 113, at 121.
153 Donoso, supra note 139, at 161.
154 GLOBAL WATERPARlNERSHIP, WATER AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM CHILE
3 (2007).
155 Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, art. 131 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122); Donoso, supra
note 139, at 160.
156 Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, art. 131 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122).
157Id. arts. 135 & 136.
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Appeals, a process that requires additional time, funding, and resources from all
. 158partIes.
If applications have competing requests and there is not sufficient water to meet
the needs of all applicants, then the applicants proceed to an auction where water rights
are acquired through a bidding process159 where they are sold to the highest bidder. Only
the President has the authority in "exceptional circumstances" to void the acution and
determine who should have the water right. 160 In the first eighteen years of the 1981
Water Code, Chile held only two auctions, data that illustrates that auctions have been
. h 161rare III t e past.
Any water use right, regardless of how the right was acquired, whether through an
application to the DGA, an auction, or a transfer, must be registered with the
Conservador de Bienes Raices (CBR) in order to prove ownership of a water right. 162
Registering water rights, if done properly, can be an important tool for coordinating water
management or water-related activities, monitoring water uses, and settling disputes. A
large reason for registering rights in Chile is to support the market for water rights.
Despite the legal requirement to register rights, "an important amount of water rights are
not legalized, that is users do not have the corresponding property titles. Different
158 Id. art. 137.
159 See id. arts. 141-48.
160 Id. art. 148; Donoso, supra note 139, at 160.
161 DOUROJEANNI, supra note 131, at 152-53. Note that this data came from the years 1980-1998. I could
not find any data pertaining to how many auctions there have been from 1998 to the present day.
162 Donato Romano & Michel Leporati, The Distributive Impacts ofthe Water Markets in Chile: A Case
Study in Limari Province, 1981-1997,41 Q. J. INT'L AGRIC. 1,4 (2001); Galaz, supra note 151, at 425.
-----------------_.__._-------
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sources reported that between 50% and 65% have not been legalized yet, even though the
Water Code of 1981 compelled [rights holders] to do SO.,,163
Transferring Water Rights
The transfer ofwater rights from an existing user to a new user is feasible under
the Chilean Water Code. Transfering water rights can encompass temporary options,
such as leasing, or can be a permanent exchange where the ownership of the water right
changes hands. In Chile, all transfer options are feasible. According to Bauer, water
rights "can be freely bought, sold, mortaged, and transferred like real estate."I64
Transfering water rights requires a market with three basic elements: (1) scarcity, which
provides value to the good being exchanged and generates the desire or need for that
good; (2) the severance of water and land rights; and (3) institutional infrastructure,
which are the laws, regulations, agencies, and processes that allow water rights to be
freely exchanged. 165
The Water Code provides the "legal preconditions for such a market" rather than
"mandat[ing] or establish[ing] a water market in rightS.,,166 Thus, the Water Code is
relatively silent in regards to the process of water transfers and leaves transfers to occur
163 BREHM, supra note 133, at 24.
164 Bauer, supra note 113, at 120.
165 Oliver M. Brandes & Linda Nowlan, Wading in Uncertain Waters: Using Markets to Transfer Water
Rights in Canada - Possibilities and Pitfalls, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 267,279 (2009).
166 Bauer, supra note 113, at 122; Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, art. 21 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley
Numero 1.122).
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among private parties. 167 The Water Code further incentives transfers by allowing water
uses to change once transferred, which increases both the value of water and the
flexibility of its uses. 168
Coordinating Multiple Uses
Coordinating multiple and competing water uses is a challenge facing every
model of freswater management. Other than establishing the three different categories of
water uses, the Chilean Water Code does not coordinate diverse uses. Problems relating
to multiple users are likely to arise in a legal regime like Chile's where uses are not
prioritized, there are no legal protections for downstream water users, and Chile's
administrative agency has very little regulatory power to resolve disputes or select
between competing uses.
Limitations on Water Rights
Because water rights holders have broad property rights, it is unsuprising that
Chile hardly imposes any limitations to qualify or restrict these rights. One limitation
that legal regimes may impose on rights-holders is the "no harm" principle, which
167 The code does require that transferred rights be registered like real estate. See Fija Texto del Codigo de
Aguas, art. 114 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122).
168 In order to incentive the transfer of water rights, it is not "necessary in transferring water rights to
continue the previous type of use to which the water was put, with individuals permitted to freely make
changes in such use." Donoso, supra note 139, at 159.
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prohibits the transer or change of water use if such a change would affect another user in
the system. However, such a rule restricts the free market of water rights since it could
preclude the sale or transfer of water rights if a third party were affected. Thus Chile's
Water Code does not enforce the no harm principle to protect third party interests.
Likewise, the Water Code does not employ the "use it or lose it" principle so water rights
holders do not have to use their water in order to maintain their right. The absence of the
"use it or loose it" principle provides rights holders with the ability to hoard and
speculate on water. To counteract these concerns, the 2005 Water Code reforms included
a provision that "charge[s] a license fee for unused water rights.,,169 In an interview,
Chilean water expert Bauer had the following to say about the new license fees:
The only provision [in the 2005 reforms] that really potentially makes a big
difference was the notion that water rights would have to be used or that a fee
would be paid for non use. Which is sort of a convoluted formulation anyway.
That was aimed at freeing up hydropower rights that people had been speculating
with. Clearly the reason for that modification was to encourage hydropower
development. 170
Chile does have a limitation on water ownership that is closely related to the use it or
loose it policy. According to this provision, a registered water right that is unused may
be transferred to a third party if the third party has freely and openly used that water
source without dispute for five years. 171 This provision has proved to be very
169 GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP, supra note 154, at 3.
170 Witte, supra note 110 (interviewing Carl 1. Bauer).
171 Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, arts. 1 & 2 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122); Rutgerd
Boelens et a1., Special Law - Recognition and Denial ofDiversity in Andean Water Control, in LIQUID
RELATIONS: CONTESTED WATER RIGHTS AND LEGAL COMPLEXITY 161 (Dik Roth et al. eds., Rutgers
University Press) (2005).
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problematic for indigenous communities. For instance, a community may have a legal
right to the water but may not have the resources or infrastructure to use the water. One
author has noted that mining companies, particularly in Northern Chile, benefit from this
legal provision as they are able to use water that belongs to the indigenous
communities. 172
Some water management schemes enforce a priority system in times of water
shortage. Chile's Water Code does not have such provisions. Instead, during periods of
water shortage, all rights holders are to equally share shortages. 173 This means, for
instance, during a drought that municipals delivering water to cities for consumption,
irrigators withdrawing water for agriculture to grow food, and mining industries using
water to extract minerals would all have to cut back equally on water use. A priority
system, however, could dictate that the mining industry must stop using water during a
shortage, and the excess water from stopping a water withdrawal could go towards
human consumption and agricultural production, life sustaining activities that are
arguably more important water uses then mining.
If Chile were to experience a drought, which is a likely climatic occurrence in
Northern Chile with the effects of climate change, the code establishes that the President
is the only figure that can declare a shortage "at the request or upon the report of the
I72 Id.
173 Renato G. Schleyer & Mark W. Rosegrant, Chilean Water Policy: The Role o/Water Rights, Institutions
and Markets, 12 INT'LJ. WATERREsOURCESDEV. 33, 37 (1996).
62
DGA.,,174 Declaring a shortage suspends basin supervisory boards (Water User
Associations, or "WUA") and allows the DGA to make decisions to minimize damage
from the drought. 175 Yet, the code specifies that such a declaration is discretionary, 176
and furthermore, the zones can only be established for six months and are non-
deferrable. I77 When a drought zone is declared, water users have the chance to reach an
agreement regarding the distribution of water. 178 Ifno agreement is reached, the DGA
then has power to redistribute water for public use. 179 Ifduring this redistribution, a
water rights holder receives "a lesser portion of water than is their due ... [the holder] will
be entitled to state compensation for the lost portion."I80
TheDGA
As already illustrated through the DGA's role and authority in issuing new water
rights, the DGA "has very little regulatory authority over private water use,,,181 and
174 Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, art. 314 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122); Rosegrant, supra
note 102, at 306.
175 Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, art. 314 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122).
176 Id. (stating ''podra ... declarar zonas de escasez .. .").
177 Id.
178 ld.
179 Id.
180 Rosegrant, supra note 102, at 306.
181 Carl J. Bauer, In the Image ofthe Market: The Chilean Model ofWater Resources Management, 3 INT'L
J. WATER 146, 151 (2005).
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instead, the code's laissez-faire principles dictate that private water rights are governed
by private civil law. Chile's leading water agency has mostly technical and
administrative functions:
... gathering and maintaining hydrologic data; inspecting large water works, such
as dams and canals; enforcing the rules governing the functioning ofprivate water
users' associations; and keeping official registries of certain water rights. The
agency can also prepare studies, reports, plans, and policy recommendations, but
these have little or no regulatory force. 182
Scholars, who have analyzed Chile's Water Code, have identified numerous limitations
in terms of the DGA's authority. Agency limitations retard the ability to maximize water
use efficiency and conservation. For instance, the DGA cannot "cancel and redistribute
unused water rights," "create river basin administrative organizations," "create minimum
water flows," and cannot "adjudicate conflicts between water users.,,183
Water User Associations
WUA are an important component of the Chilean water management model.
There are three types ofWUA defined under the Water Code, all of which are afforded
legal status and allows them to take out collective loans.184 A water rights holder is
182 BAUER, supra note 93, at 34; see also Donoso, supra note 139, at 161; Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas,
arts. 296 & 299 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley NUmero 1.122).
183 Donoso, supra note 139, at 161; BAUER,supra note 93, at 33.
184 ROBERT R. HEARNE & K. WILLIAM EASTER, WATER ALLOCATION AND WATER MARKETS: AN ANALYSIS
OF GAINS-FROM TRADE IN CHILE 7 (World Bank Tech. Pap. No. 315, 1995); BREHM, supra note 133, at 3.
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required to join a WUA,185 however, WUA membership is restricted to only water rights
holders. The Water Code mandates that a WUA form when two or more "persons hold
the right to use water from the same source (for example, river, dam, channel or
underground water) [as] this creates a de facto association between them.,,186 These
water rights holders then must agree upon what type of legal association they will
establish use to manage their resource. 187 The type of association selected depends upon
the type of water body is being managed:
[Water rights holders] may regulate ... [their right] by establishing a water
community (comunidad de aguas), a channel user's association (asociacion de
canalistas), or any other legal association they may agree on. The formalities of
organization are simpler for comunidades de aguas than for asociaciones de
canalistas. The former are usually in charge of secondary infrastructure used by
neighbouring [sic] farmers; the latter are in charge of large infrastructure, from
principal channels to dams.. .In the case of natural sources of water, such as rivers,
users must organize as a control committee Uunta de vigilancia). Both [comunidad
de aguas and asociacion de canalistas members] may be members of ajunta de
vigilancia, which may also include individuals, public entities, urban public utility
companies, hydroelectric enterprises or any other user that has rights over water
. f I 188commg rom a natura source.
Water rights holders can also belong to multiple types ofWUA. For example, "a
comunidad de aguas might govern a secondary channel corning from a principal channel
d b . ., d I' 189governe y an asoczaclOn e cana lstas.
185 Schleyer, supra note 173, at 38.
186 Jd.
187 Jd.
188 Jd.
189 Jd.
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Even though the Water Code stipulates these associations must form, the WUA
"are owned and operated by their members, and charge fees based on their capital and
operating costS.,,190 Even where rights holder owns water contained in a government
developed irrigation system, that government system will come under WUA
management. 191 WUA have a variety of responsibilities, such as "maintain[ing] the canal
systems, keep[ing] records of rights holders, apportion[ing] water to individual rights
holders according to their recorded shares, and enforc[ing] water rights.,,192
Conflict Resolution
In terms of resolving conflicts, an aspect of water management that will become
increasingly critical with climate change, the Chilean government has minimal
involvement "and resolutions rely on private negotiations within the different water user
associations [WUA] and the judicial system.,,193 Deregulation has shifted the
responsibility of conflict resolution to WUA. These WUA function mainly "to distribute
water and enforce its correct use by its members, and to collect fees for construction,
maintenance and administration of irrigation infrastructure.,,194 In the absence of a
190 HEARNE, supra note 184, at 8.
191 Schleyer, supra note 185, at 7.
192 HEARNE, supra note 184, at 8.
193 Ga1az, supra note 151, at 416.
194 ld. at 425; Rosegrant, supra note 102, at 307.
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powerful central administrative agency, the WUA are the most important institutions for
resolving water conflicts and for the allocation of water. 195
The only alternative other than through a WUA to resolve conflict is to file a
complaint through the judicial system. Yet, the Water Code stipulates that the judicial
system can only resolve conflicts that could not be resolved by WUA. 196 When a party
does seek judicial resolution, they file their disputes before an intermediary civil court as
no special water court exists.
195 Galaz, supra note 151, at 425; Rosegrant, supra note 102, at 307.
196 Donoso, supra note 139, at 168.
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CHAPTER V
CASE STUDIES
Understanding the specifications of Chile's Water Code and identifying
provisions that may create ethical problems under climate change only creates a
theoretical picture. Since climate change has not yet drastically shifted hydrological
patterns for many communities, there are no case studies to point to at this time.
Nevertheless, the best means to illustrate the anticipated ethical dilemmas resulting from
climate change is to shift this analysis from theoretical to empirical. To illustrate
perceived ethical dilemmas and events that have yet to occur is to identify case studies
that highlight the current ethical problems with the Water Code that will only worsen
with climate change. The case studies draw from a variety of disciplines, but all examine
the ethical deficiencies created by Chile's water laws. Using case studies from different
academic disciplines provides multiple methods and perspectives of approaching the
same issues. Bringing these studies together and the conclusions these studies reach,
highlight common ethical concerns that are already embedded in Chile's water
management regime, concerns that can be tied back to specific legal provisions.
68
The Disparate Effects ofWater Resource Management: Case Studies
Low-Income Farmers
In the first study, Donato Romano and Michel Leporati examined the 1981 Water
Code's distributive impact on "peasants," a population the authors defined as "the poorest
sectors and on those whose subsistence is mainly dependent on access to water.,,197 The
authors undertook this study because they noted that most ofthe studies on Chile's Water
Code debated the efficiency of water markets and whether water markets were
advantageous or disadvantageous. Thus, the authors countered the usual water market
debate with scholarship discussing distributional disadvantages. 198 To measure
distributive impacts, the study analyzed water registrations between 1981 and 1997 from
the Limari river valley. 199 The registered water users in this region were "peasant
agriculture, capitalist agriculture and non-agricultural sectors.,,200
The province of Limari in northern Chile is a semi-arid region that produces
commercial crops such as ''pisco grapes, avocados, green peppers and artichokes.,,201
Even though the average rainfall "does not exceed l20mm and the potential
197 Donato Romano & Michel Leporati, The Distributive Impacts ofthe Water Markets in Chile: A Case
Study in Limari Province, 1981-1997,41 Q. J. INT'L AGRIC. 1,2 (2001).
198 Id. at 3.
199 Id. at 4.
200 Id. at 6.
201 Eduardo Zegarra, Water Market and Coordination Failures: The Case of the Limari
Valley in Chile 31 (July 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file
with author).
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evapotranspiration exceeds 1,000mm,,,202 the Limari valley is still one of the two "most
significant Chilean agricultural valleys in which active water markets appeared after the
1981 Water Code. ,,203 Agriculture is productive in this region because of "La Paloma
System," a series of reservoirs and channels. This infrastructure facilitates an active
water market that enabled Romano and Leporati's study.
The results of the study found that the 1981 Water Code had a disparate and
negative effect on lower income water users. Following implementation of the 1981
Water Code, all sectors of water users were active in the water market,204 An active
market, however, does not mean equitable participation among all the water rights
holders. Peasants were active in the market, but through claims of original rights,
whereas non-agricultural sectors were involved in transactions since these stakeholders
were more likely to re-sell water than were peasants.20S As time progressed, the authors
found that the distribution of water rights among various stakeholders became
unbalanced as "[p]easant agriculture show[ed] a general and consistent loss of water
resources (-83.37% in terms of per capita water shares, with the number of users
decreasing from 10,360 in 1981 to 4,800 in 1997).,,206 According to the authors, peasants
were losing water rights because of "the worsening of peasants' income distribution" and
202 Nicole Kretschmer, Sandrine Corso & Pablo Alvarez, Water Allocation Strategies and Their
Implications -A Drought in the Limarf Watershed, Chile, WORLD WATER CONGRESS 2, Sept. 2004,
http://www.worldwatercongress2008 .org/resource/authors/abs564_article.pdf.
203 Zegarra, supra note 201, at 30.
204 Romano, supra note 197, at 10.
205 !d. at 11.
206 !d. at 8.
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"the accumulation of resources by the most powerful social-economic groups.,,207 From
this empirical evidence, the authors concluded, "that the market, when left to itself,
though able to increase the general efficiency of the system, is not able to ensure an
equitable distribution of resources and income.,,208
A second study, conducted by Victor Galaz, also looked at the distributive impact
of Chile's Water Code on small farmers rather than market efficiencies, but used game
theory rather than water registrations to explain how water markets disempowered
underprivileged rural communities.209 In the study, Galaz provides two cases where
underprivileged water users failed to successfully challenge water rights:
Peasant farmers in Las Pataguas, Valdivia de Paine, located 50 km from Santiago,
have experienced a severe and long-lived water conflict with a real estate
investor. The conflict started in the early 1970s as a result of construction by the
investor on his own plots. This led to serious disturbances of the water flow to the
farmers. The diversion was, according to governmental officials, a deliberate
attempt to destroy the productivity of the land, and to force the peasant farmers to
sell their plots. It was not until 1986 - after more than ten years (!) - that a few of
the farmers individually decided to take the problem to court. The ruling was in
favour of the farmers, but this did not stop the continued diversion of water by the
real estate investor. The same procedure was repeated in 1991: an appeal to the
court led to a ruling in favour of the farmers, but this did not stop continued
violations of their water rights by the investor. This problem has affected the
income of 300 persons dependent on small scale agriculture to such an extreme
that a number ofthem felt obliged to sell their plots and find other sources of
income.210
The second case study tells a similar story:
207 [d. at 8, 11.
208 [d. at 8.
209 See Victor Galaz, Stealing From the Poor? Game Theory and the Politics ofWater Markets in Chile, 13
ENVTL. POL. 414 (2004).
210 [d. at 419 (citing Cannen Cancino, Conjlicto de Aguas de Regadio en el Sector Las Pataguas- Valdivia
de Paine, conference paper, Santiago (2001)).
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Small fanners organized in a water user community in the Azapa valley, Arica,
have experienced similar problems. In 1981 the water company SENDOS
(Servicio Naciona1 de Obras Sanitarias) made a request to the DGA (General
Directorate ofWater) - the governmental agency in charge of granting new water
rights - for the exploitation of550 1itres [sic] per second ofwater. The request
was denied by the DGA, largely because of a petition put forward by the fanners
showing that this extraction would severely affect existing water flows nonnally
used by them for irrigation. Despite the DGA's decision, and without the
necessary water rights, SENDOS decided in 1984 to start the construction
necessary for water exploitation. Once again, the fanners took the case to court,
which ruled in their favour [sic] and ordered a halt to constructions. This
temporarily halted construction, but in 1991 the water company ESSAT (Empresa
de Servicios Sanitarios de Tarapaca' S.A.) - a privatised [sic] version of SENDOS
- resumed the exploitation of the aquifer in the Azapa valley. This violation was
once again taken to court, but this time the court rejected the claim and the
fanners lost the case. ESSAT is now exploiting water resources in the valley?ll
According to Galaz, these and countless other similar stories212 of disparate impacts on
marginalized populations are the real-life consequences that were incentivized by the
1981 Water Code.213
Galaz concludes that campesinoi14 or any indigent water right holder will accept
violations of their water rights that benefit more powerful and resourceful water rights
holders.215 When a violation occurs, water rights holders have two options to redress the
wrong: report to a WUA or litigate through the judicial system. Yet neither option is
actually viable for disadvantaged groups. WUA are unlikely to resolve a dispute in favor
211 Id. (citing D. Aviles Herbas, Sobreexplotacion del Acuifero del Valle de Azapa -Arica I Region, in
CONFEREDERACION DE CANALISTAS DE CHILE (1993)).
212 See id. at 420 (referring to Table 1, which documents a number of water rights violations against
underprivileged water users).
213 Galaz, supra note 209, at 429.
214 Campesinos, as defmed by Galaz, are "peasant fanners." Id. at 424.
215 !d.
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of a poor farmer since "big agriculture tends to dominate" the WUA.216 Poorer parties
are risk adverse to litigation because they do not have the resources to fund it.217 Given
"the fact that water users are highly heterogeneous in terms of social and economic
power... it [is] very costly and irrational for poor water users to report violations of their
water rightS.,,218
Consequently, "wealthy users[] are provided with a highly advantaged
position.,,219 Tolerance of water rights violations enables wealthier water right holders to
have "theoretical access to 'free water. ",220 For instance, if a water rights holder needs
more water, the options are: (1) to buy or lease water rights, which can be costly; (2)
increase water efficiency, an option that also has associated costs; or (3), steal water from
low-income individuals who do not have the power to enforce their legal rightS.221 Since
stealing water is the most rational and cost-efficient way of increasing one's water needs,
Galaz reasons that this will be the approach wealthier water rights holders use to meet
increasing demands. Domination over water resources by the powerful and financially
secure users also helps explain the anomaly "that the rural population in Chile has less
216 !d. at 430.
217Id.
218 !d. at 429.
219 !d. at 432.
220Id. at 431.
221Id.
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access to improved drinking water (58% in the year 2000) than in countries such as
Argentina (73% in 1990), Bolivia (64% in 2000) and Uruguay (93% in 2000).,,222
Indigenous Populations: Mapuche
A third study, authored by Lila Barrera-Hernandez, examines the struggles of
Chile's Mapuche people against the development of the Pangue-Ralco Dams in order to
maintain control over the water resources within their territories.223 The Mapuche are
indigenous peoples of South America who, following a long history struggling against
subjugation, now largely live in Chile and Argentina.224 The Mapuche are "spiritually,
culturally and materially connected" to their "lands and resources, particularly water.,,225
Even the name "Mapuche," which translates to "people of the land," signifies the
community's connection to their surrounding natural resources and environment.226
One of the Mapuche territories, the upper Bio Bio, became a controversial site
and a battle for control over natural resources in 1989 when the Chilean government
222 !d. at 416 (citing United Nations Statistics Division, Demographic and Social Statistics,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd!demographic/sociaVwatsan.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2003)). The most recent
UNSD report - June 2009 - provided the following statistics for improved access to water in rural areas:
Argentina (80% in 2009), Bolivia (69%), Uruguay (100%), Chile (72%). United Nations Statistics
Division, Demographic and Social Statistics,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd!demographic/products/socind!watsan.htm (last visited April 28, 2010).
223 Lila Barrera-Hemadez, Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Natural Resource Development: Chile's
Mapuche Peoples and the Right to Water, 11 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMPo L. 1,2 (2005).
224 Id. at 12.
225 Id.
226 !d.
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approved a hydroelectric development project called the Pangue-Ra1co Dams. What
ensued was a lengthy legal battle between the various stakeholders and the Mapuche,
who were fighting to protect their land and culture.227 The conflict ended when the
stakeholders signed the Amicable Agreement on September 16,2003, which permitted
the dam construction to proceed. Barrera-Hernandez concludes that the Mapuche
suffered this loss because "[t]he implementation of [Chile's] neo-liberal economic
policies ...resulted in increased pressure and demands over indigenous lands, water, and
other resources resulting in numerous confrontations between indigenous peoples and the
government.,,228
The fight over water rights was a central component in the construction of these
dams, particular in the Ralco project. When the Chilean government approved the
projects, Empresa Nacional de Electicidad S.A. (ENDESA), the private electric company
constructing the dams, already owned a substantial portion ofthe water rights but needed
to secure even more rights to operate the dam.229 To supplement their needs, ENDESA
filed for rights to the water that flowed through indigenous territory. Opponents of the
project challenged the application through the judicial system, but the court ruled in favor
of ENDESA and granted the private company water rights and failed to protect the
. d' 1 . h 230In Igenous c aIm to t e resource.
227 For a good summary about the legal dispute over the construction of the Pangue-Ralco Dams, see id. at
14-22.
228Id. at 13.
229 Id. at 22.
230 Id. at 23.
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According to Barrera-Hernandez, ENDESA was able to claim these water rights
because the Chilean Water Code's treatment ofwater?31 First, the code allowed
ENDESA to acquire private rights to the water because the code only mandates that the
company had to demonstrate that the water was physically and legally available.232 This
was not a challenge for ENDESA as the code does not legitimize water rights acquired
through traditional rights without special proof, and thus the Mapuche were unable to
have their traditional water rights legally recognized?33 Second, the code severed the
relationship between land and water rights. As a result, even though the Mapuche had a
right to traditional lands, these lands were not concomitant with water rights.234 While
the Amicable Agreement had terms to compensate the Mapuche for property lost by the
projects, this property did not include water rights.235
In the conclusion of her article, Barrera-Hernandez searched for legal responses to
address the gap in indigenous water rights created by the Chilean Water Code. The
author found none?36 She concludes by stating: "[t]he results of the combined
application ofneo-liberal water and natural resources development law and policy in
Chile is a relegation of indigenous customary water rights and water management
231 Id. at 25.
232 I d. at 24.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 26.
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practices in favour [sic] of economic development uses where water is deemed to achieve
its maximum potential value.,,237
Indigenous Populations: Aymara
The fourth and final case study under review here, which combines previous field
research with a recent Chilean Supreme Court case, is the most recent and perhaps the
most hopeful story for protecting disadvantaged users. The judicial opinion suggests that
secure water rights for underprivileged populations is possible through legal pluralism,
which could lead to stronger ethical results for water users. Between January 2003 and
February 2004, author Isabel Maria Madaleno conducted participant interviews of
Aymara peoples in Chile's Tarapaca region to record the consequences of the 1981 Water
Code on the Aymara people.238 The Tarapaca region in northern Chile is ancestral
territory for the Aymaran Indians.239 The region is arid with "[s]evere climate and scare
natural resources.,,240 Because the water source for the region is fed by rainfall or glacier
snowmelt and therefore is in short supply,241 the Aymara people spatially organized
settlements and ancestral farming practices to best utilize the region's natural
237 Id. at 27.
238 Isabel Maria Madalena, The Privatisation a/Water and its Impacts on Settlement and Traditional
Cultural Practices in Northern Chile, 123 SCOT. GEOGRAPHICALJ. 193,195 (2007).
239 Id.
240 Id. at 197.
241 Id.
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resources.
242 Traditional practices were disrupted and displaced by Spanish colonization
because the Spanish valued the land for its mineral resources.243 Today, the Aymara
people sti11live in this region, but the scarce water supply is in greater demand from the
agriculture, mining, and hydroelectric power generation industries that have moved into
h . 244t e regIOn.
According to Madaleno, implementation of the 1981 Water Code led to disastrous
results.245 Conflict over water resources, which tends to favor wealthier economic groups
over indigenous populations, is forcibly removing the Aymara population from their land
and forcing them to abandon their traditionallifestyle.246 Take, for example, the 14 year
long conflict between the Aymara communities and Agua Mineral Chusmiza, a private
water bottling company. Agua Mineral Chusmiza moved into Chusmiza, a remote
Andean pueblo containing sulphur rich spring water in order to bottle and sell this water,
water that is used by the Aymara for traditional irrigation practices and water the
community believes have performed miracles, such as curing paralysis.247 The Aymara
filed a lawsuit in the 1990s against the private industry.
242 Id. at 195.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 200.
245 Isabel Maria Madalena & Alberto Gurovich, Conflicting Water Usages in Northern Chile, 44 BOLETlN
DE LA A.G.E. 439,440 (2007).
246 Madalena, supra note 238, at 206.
247 Madalena, supra note 246, at 441.
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For 14 years, the case made no headway. Madaleno reasoned that private
industries like Agua Mineral Chusmiza were able to trump traditional water rights
because the Water Code "separated water from land ownership, ascribed separately
superficial and groundwater resources, and permitted faster return activities, such as
mining, to appropriate all available water rights. Ancestral group loyalties were broken
and the water cycle and the ecosystem approach, for so long respected, abandoned by the
new water management models.,,248
The Aymara lawsuit against Agua Mineral Chusmiza did not conclude like the
Mapuche-ENDESA conflict. Rather, this past November 2009 the Chilean Supreme
Court reached an unprecedented ruling when it unanimously upheld the indigenous
communities' water rights, producing the first judicial ruling in favor of such rights.249
The Supreme Court reasoned that Agua Mineral Chusmiza activities amounted to a
constitutional violation.25o According to Article 19 of the Constitution, "[t]he rights of
private citizens over waters, recognized or constituted in conformity with the law, shall
grant proprietorship to the owners thereo£,,251 From this provision, the Court reasoned
that the constitutional language "recognized or constituted" included waters not only
recognized by the Water Code, which would favor only private companies to the
detriment of the Aymara, but the language also recognized water granted under laws that
248 Madaleno, supra note 238, at 204 (internal citations omitted).
249 Jeremy Valeriote, Chile's Supreme Court Upholds Indigenous Water Use Rights, THE SANTIAGO TIMES
Nov. 30, 2009.
250 Alejandro Papic Dominguez con Comunidad Indigena Aymara Chuzmiza v. Usmagama, No. 2840-2008
(Nov. 25,2009), http://www.elaw.org/node/53l7.
251 CONST. CHILE art. 19 § 24.
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established customary uses of water to indigenous communities. The Court specifically
referred to Article 64 ofLey 19.253, also known as the Indigenous Law. The Indigenous
Law reads:
One must especially protect the waters ofAymara and Atacama communities.
Waters will be considered property to be owned and used by the indigenous
community, established by this Act, the waters found in the areas of the
community, such as rivers, canals, ditches and slopes, without prejudice to the
rights that third parties have registered pursuant to General Water Code....New
water rights are not be granted on lakes, ponds, springs, rivers and aquifers that
supply water to the property of several Indigenous Communities established by this
law without guaranteed, in previous form, the normal water supply to the affected
communities.252
The Indigenous Law was enacted in 1993 specially to counteract the drastic
consequences the neoliberal water policies were having on indigenous communities. The
law was legislated following Pinochet's ousting in March 1990 and Chile's re-
democratization.253 After the implementation of the 1981 Water Code, which did not
carve out provisions to address traditional uses ofwater, indigenous water problems
received very little attention.254 With the growing economy and competing water uses,
most indigenous peasants had no water rights by the 1990s.255
The Indigenous Law was introduced to fill this gap in the Water Code. Under
Article 20 of the Indigenous Law, the constitution, regularization, or purchase ofwater
252 Alejandro Papic Dominguez con Comunidad Indigena Aymara Chuzmiza v. Usmagama, No. 2840-2008
(Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.elaw.org/node/5317 (translated by author).
253 David Carruthers, Environmental Politics in Chile: Legacies ofDictatorship and Democracy, 22 THIRD
WORLD Q. 343, 345 (2001).
254 Rutgerd Boelens et aI., Special Law - Recognition and Denial ofDiversity in Andean Water Control, in
LIQUID RELATIONS: CONTESTED WATER RIGHTS AND LEGAL COMPLEXITY 158 (Dik Roth et ai. eds., 2005).
255 !d.
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rights is guaranteed.256 In the provision cited by the Chilean Supreme Court, the law also
prohibits new water rights over an indigenous water supply without guaranteeing a
normal water supply to indigenous communities.257 Using this provision, the Court
concluded, "[o]n this topic [of Article 64] it is useful to clarify that any lack of
registration of customary water rights does not mean [the right is] absent, but [its absence
means] only the lack of formalization and registration... [P]recisely because the right
exists, it is recognized by law....,,258
The Indigenous Law is a perfect example of legal pluralism in effect. Under the
1981 Water Code, traditional uses of water were not automatically legally recognized and
therefore traditional water uses were granted to other water users. To legitimize rights
excluded from the Chilean Water Code, legislators passed the Indigenous Law, which
incorporated and validated non-western values of water resource management into the
market system. Undeniably, there are a lot of contradictions between the Water Code and
the Indigenous Law, and ultimately the Water Code is primarily seen as the stronger of
the two authorities.259 Nevertheless, the outcome ofthe Supreme Court case is quite
significant because it substantiates the authority of the Indigenous Law and serves as a
tool for a more ethical management over water resources.
256 Indigenous Law, Chile (Number 19,253 D. 0[5110/2003), art. 20 ("[f]inanciar la constituci6n,
regularizaci6n 0 compra de derechos de aguas 0 financiar obras destinadas a obtener este recurso.").
257 CONST. CHILE art. 64; Boelens, supra note 255, at 159.
258 Alejandro Papic Dominguez con Comunidad Indigena Aymara Chuzmiza v. Usmagama, No. 2840-2008
(Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.elaw.org/node/5317.
259 Boelens, supra note 255, at 157-61.
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Common Themes
The synthesis of these four studies highlights a number of important issues for this
thesis?60 First, the policies of the 1981 Water Code have inequitable and
disproportionate impacts upon specific segments of the Chile's populations. Climate
change will only exacerbate these disparities and encourage wealthier or more powerful
water rights holder to violate traditional rights or rights held by weaker users. Those
right holders with political and financial security will be able to protect existing rights by
utilizing the WUA to their advantage or accessing the courts. Furthermore, as Galaz's
game theory analysis suggests, wealthier water users will be able to supplement
diminishing water sources with the rights belonging to disadvantaged populations in a
changing climate and not have to fear compensation. Second, these studies begin to
create an identity for the populations experiencing the greatest negative consequences
from the 1981 Water Code. The communities include those that have limited social
influence and economic resources, whose subsistence is dependent upon reliable water
resources, and those who were at one time autonomous but now struggle to self-define.
Literally, the Chilean water model and policy is "destroy[ing] or erod[ing] existing
systems oflocal water rights in peasant and indigenous communities who had vested
rights through years oflabor investments and use.,,261
260 In addition to the four case studies offered in this thesis, a recent article in the New York Times reported
similar water woes occurring in Quillagua, Chile. See Alexei Barrionuevo, Chilean Town Withers in Free
Market/or Water, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 14,2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/worldlamericas/15chile.html.
261 Rutgerd Boelens & Margreet Zwarteveen, Anomalous Water Rights and the Politics o/Normalization:
Collective Water Control and Privatization Policies in the Andean Region, in LIQUID RELATIONS:
CONTESTED WATER RIGHTS AND LEGAL COMPLEXITY 114 (Dik Roth et al. eds., 2005).
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The third lesson extracted from these case studies is that there is no institutional
protection for these populations. Not only do these populations have substantially
inequitable rights, but these populations experience procedural inequity as well since they
have no voice in the legal process. Fourth, public choice theory suggests disadvantaged
populations have too distinct of interests and are too fragmented to mobilize and
influence legal change. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that Chilean legislators would
make public policy decisions to reform water laws that would favor these groups. Fifth,
as an economic model, the 1981 Water Code is incapable of accounting for
environmental and social needs, which is an unsurprising conclusion given the Pinochet
reforms did not address these issues. "[T]he economic way of thinking about water and
thinking about water as a commodity or a good has not helped to alleviate the tension
with the human rights and ethical way of thinking. This is because very often the
underprivileged are not satisfied with simple money.,,262
Lastly, the recent Supreme Court decision upholding water rights for the Aymara
demonstrates that equitable and ethical solutions for water needs are not found in the
current Water Code. Rather, the Supreme Court had to find an alternative legal authority
to the Water Code in order to legitimize the indigenous people's water rights. This
decision is one example that a legally pluralistic framework is an ethical solution to
current and future water supply shortages.
262 Panel: Ethics-Based Decision-Making in Societal Water Management, 6 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 57,
60 (2008).
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Factoring in Climate Change
None of the four case studies address the effects of climate change. Thus, the
synthesis of these materials heightens the concern that governments are ignoring diverse
water values while downplays the connection to climate change. In the absence of
climate change, many of the arguments made in this thesis are still relevant and reforms
to water management schemes could address the homogenization of water practices. In
the absence of climate change, I would still argue that a universalistic approach to water
management ignores diverse cultural water needs.
Climate change factors in though because it creates an ethical obligation for
sovereignties to respond to the water crisis in a manner that can address the underlying
disparate impacts of freshwater resource management. Questions of ethical water
resource allocation inextricably overlap with climate policy initiatives. And as the next
chapter illustrates, often times the problematic ethical provisions are the very same
provisions that will be problematic under climate change. As policymakers and scholars
search for ways to reform water management under climate change,263 this thesis exposes
the often-overlooked ethical consequences of water management decisions that
policymakers should take into account while reforming legal models. Without a voice in
climate change water reform, these marginalized populations will likely witness the re-
allocation and re-prioritization of water uses that excludes their needs.
263 See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony ofState Water Law, 29 STAN. ENVT. L.J.
1 (2010).
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CHAPTER VI
ETHICAL ISSUES
As the previous chapter illustrated, Chile's water resource management promotes
inequity among water users because the system allows for the abuse of disadvantaged
users. This inequity is occurring in the absence of climate change altering hydrologic
conditions, which raises serious concerns that water scarcity caused by climate change
will intensify inequity. This raises the question of this chapter: what specific legal
provisions are causing or contributing to this inequity? The analysis below illustrates that
flexibility will be an important component to an ethical framework for managing water in
a changing climate. Chile employs many legal principles that promote flexibility which,
generally speaking, should be preserved in water policy reforms. However, the code's
adaptability fails to justly allocate water resources because the code is geared towards an
economic rather then an ethical model. The following discussion indentifies some of the
most important legal principles in designing an ethical framework given the anticipated
hydrologic effects of climate change.
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Water Markets
Although a water market is an attractive option to manage water resources in
response to climate change given the flexibility of a free market system,264 privatizing
water rights and treating water resources as a commodity has significant ethical
shortcomings. According to law professor Joseph Dellapenna, a scholar on water
management and international comparative law, water markets are problematic because
they create externalities that are inherently unethica1.265 Dellapenna defines an
externality as "a use by a person [that] affects uses by other users drawing from the same
source, with the result that any significant a change in use infringes upon the interests of
the other users.,,266 These externalities arise, "when one user attempts to convey her
water right to another, particularly to one seeking to make a completely different use of
the water. ,,267
In Chile, those externalities impact population segments that do not have the
finances to participate in the water market, and therefore, do not have a legally
protectable interest. Rather "[w]ater markets are generally driven by those who have the
most capacity to participate in the market: big irrigation, industry, and those with
264 "One of the main efficiency gains from a water market is that it allows higher flexibility in the allocation
of the resource, avoiding the traditional bundling of water and land rights." Eduardo Zegarra, Water
Market and Coordination Failures: The Case of the Limari Valley in Chile 20 (July 2002) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with author).
265 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting the Law o/Water Management to Global Climate Change and Other
Hydropolitical Stresses, 35 1. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 1301, 1307 (1999).
266/d.
267 I d.
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urbanization concerns.,,268 Consequently, when water is treated as a commodity, the
economic value will trump other non-economic values embedded in water. For instance,
there have been "cases ...where third parties request water rights [that] have belonged by
tradition to another person.,,269 Thus, those segments of society unable to take part in the
water market will always be the losers in such a system.
Another inevitable loser in the free-market system is the environment itself
because the free-market system does not incentivize conservation. Although this thesis is
primarily focused on the human aspect of ethical issues, policymakers should be aware
that water ethics includes an ecological dimension as well. According to Peter Gleick, an
international expert on freshwater resources, selling water deters conservation because
increased efficiency leads to decreased revenue and "conservation is often less capital
intensive and therefore creates fewer opportunities for investors.',270 Yet proponents of
water markets defend the system by arguing that "[i]ncreased marketability could both
redirect available water to needed areas of growth, and inject .. .incentives for
conservation. Water marketing could also enable water rights to be purchased for
environmental purposes via instream conservation easements, trusts, or similar
devices.',271 More important then the substance of this debate for the purpose ofthis
268 Panel: Water Ethics and Commodification ofFreshwater Resources, 6 SANTA CLARAJ. INT'LL. 15,18
(2008) (commentary made by Dr. Larry Swatuk).
269 MONICA Rios BREHM & JORGE QUIROZ, THE MARKET FOR WATER RIGHTS IN CHILE: MAJOR ISSUES 24
(1995).
270 PETER H. GLEICK, GARY WOLFF, ELIZABETH L. CHALECKI & RACHEL REYES, THE NEW ECONOMY OF
WATER: THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF FRESH WATER 51 (2002).
271 Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony ofState Water Law, 29 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 1, 10,
25 (2010).
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thesis is to note that the Chilean Water Code has no provisions to incentive conservation
efforts. Thus, future research should examine what legal provisions will best protect
environmental ethics.
Narrow Definition ofLegally Cognizable Interests
There are specific provisions within the Water Code, such as Articles 131, that
precipitate disparate impacts. According to Article 131 of the Water Code, when an
applicant is filing for a new water right that mayor will effect a third party, the applicant
is required to notify the third party by publishing their request for a water right in a
regional publication or official periodica1.272 However, this legal procedure presumes
effected parties have access to the publication, know to actively look for such information
in the gazette, or even have the ability to read or comprehend the published information.
Additionally, third parties are only those who have legally recognized water rights. Thus,
individuals or communities using water without a legitimate claim to that water cannot be
harmed in a legal sense if a new rights holder diminishes the water's flow.
The Water Code is able to define who does or does not have a protectable interest.
If a code creates too broad of a definition for recognizable interests, then the code risks
being impractical because the code cannot realistically protect everyone's water interests
and needs, especially under climate change scenarios. For instance, if a management
272 Lila Barrera-Hernadez, Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Natural Resource Development: Chile's
Mapuche Peoples and the Right to Water, 11 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMPo L. 1,25 (2005); Fija Texto del
Codigo de Aguas, art. 131 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122).
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model allowed any community or individual to challenge a water use or transfer that
caused harm regardless if those challenging had a legal right, the model would be
rendered useless. On the other hand, if the code defines what parties have a legally
cognizable interest too narrowly, the code risks being unethical by excluding segments of
society that have no compensation for harms caused by other users. The challenge in
creating an ethical framework for water resource management is striking a balance in
defining who has a legally protected interest.
Conflict Resolution
Water User Associations (WUA)
Problems with procedural equity also arise in resolving conflicts over water
rights. Recall that the Water Code decentralized water governance to the extent that
conflicts are resolved either by market forces, the WUA or by the judicial system. Of
these options, the WUA is the primary means of resolving conflicts. Shifting the
responsibility of conflict resolution to a WUA creates a number of problems. "One major
problem.. .is that the Chilean water user associations are by no means ... the well-
developed institutions some claim.,,273 On a related note, WUA are criticized for lacking
the professionalism to resolve conflicts since "many lack the legal as well as technical
273 Victor Galaz, Stealing From the Poor? Game Theory and the Politics ofWater Markets in Chile, 13
ENVTL. POL. 414,425 (2004).
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capacity needed to solve water resource conflicts.,,274 Since WUA have restricted
membership, meaning only a water rights holder can belong, a selective portion of rights
holders actually benefit from WUA services. Scholars criticize the WUA because
recognized water rights holders can be excluded from WUA and remain unorganized.275
Furthermore, community members who do not hold rights but are impacted by WUA
decisions are excluded from the process.
Internal politics and the socio-political power differentials between members of
the WUA also influence members' decisions whether to use the WUA services. Since
WUA are dominated by water rights holders of big agriculture,276 "campesinos seldom
have access to them because either they do not tend to be de facto members of them, or -
if they are - they do not trust them to represent their interests.,,277 Consider the following
example:
In Belen, Precordillera Comuna de Putre, the great majority of irrigators,
smallholders who depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, called for changing
the irrigation schedule in order to intensify their agriculture and save water. They
wanted to have more frequent irrigation turns with smaller flows, a decision
ratified in several community assemblies. But in Belen, a majority of water
shares is owned by a small group of wealthy absentee landholders who reside in
the city of Arica and make a living out of other economic activities. They only go
to the irrigation system when necessary, for example when they have their water
turns. Obviously, they have no interest in increasing irrigation frequency, for it
would mean more time and travel costs. This group's voting weight and related
274Id. at 426.
275Id.
276Id. at 430; CARLl BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT: PRIVATIZATION, WATER MARKETS, AND THE STATE
IN CHILE 67 (1998).
277 Galaz, supra note 274, at 426.
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decision-making power prevents the majority of smallholders who depend on
agriculture from improving their irrigation system and economic productivity?78
Considering these dynamics, "the probability is low that peasant farmers will try to get
assistance from the widely recognised [sic] and important Chilean WUA.,,279
Judicial System
Parties may also choose to have their disputes resolved through the judicial
system. However, like the WUA, the judicial system has a number of flaws that create a
barrier to justice, particularly for unprivileged individuals as well. First, the judicial
system "is too slow, too costly and too unpredictable.,,280 The judiciary is considered
"unpredictable" because "judges often must take a decision based on limited information
or technical expertise, few legislative or constitutional guidelines and little time for
deliberation.,,281 Chile does not employ special arbiters of water disputes, which results
in "similar cases ... sometimes resolved in radically different ways.,,282 The average
length the court takes to resolve a case also poses as a barrier to justice. During the years
1992-1993, ordinary civil law cases took 1,009 days to settle, primarily because the
278 Rutgerd Boelens & Margreet Zwarteveen, Anomalous Water Rights and the Politics ojNormalization:
Collective Water Control and Privatization Policies in the Andean Region, in LIQUID RELATIONS:
CONTESTED WATER RIGHTS AND LEGAL COMPLEXITY 111 (Dik Roth et al. eds., 2005).
279 Galaz, supra note 274, at 426.
280 JOHN BRISCOE, PABW ANGUITASALAS & HUMBERTO PENA T., MANAGING WATER AS AN ECONOMIC
RESOURCE: REFLECTIONS ON THE CHILEAN EXPERIENCE 9 (World Bank) (1998).
281 Galaz, supra note 274, at427 (citing to BAUER, supra note 277, at 22.
282 BRISCOE, supra note 281, at 6.
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judicial system was under-resourced.283 Given the technical and complicated nature of
hydrology, water disputes are often more complicated to resolve then say a breach of
contract claim or tort claim. Therefore the average time to resolve a dispute about water
could be longer then 1,009 days. In the face of climate change, cases may become moot
before a court may resolve a dispute.
The longer a conflict remains unsettled, the more costly the dispute becomes for
litigants. This means indigent individuals or groups are precluded from the judicial
system because of financial barriers.284 While there is fee legal assistance in Chile for
clients oflimited means, the availability of such assistance "tends to be irregular and
chronically lacking personnel and financial resources.,,285 Low-income individuals also
view the courts unfavorably, perceiving them "as designed 'by the rich for the rich.",286
If a litigant is unsuccessful in a court of first impression, appealing the decision is a
procedural option but financially unrealistic. In 2002, attorney fees for an appeal were
estimated to be $670 usn, a prohibitive cost when the total annual income for a
campesino was "well below $500 USD.,,287
283 JUAN ENRIQUE VARGAS VIANCOS & JORGE CORREA SUTIL, DIAGNOSTICO DEL SISTEMA JUDICIAL
CHILENO 44 (1995); Galaz, supra note 274, at 427.
284 See Rutgerd Boelens et aI., Special Law - Recognition and Denial ofDiversity in Andean Water
Control, in LIQUID RELATIONS: CONTESTED WATER RIGHTS AND LEGAL COMPLEXITY 158 (Dik Roth et aI.
eds., 2005) (stating "[b]ecause of the high costs and legalistic tradition connoted by law suites, indigenous
and rural communities generally cannot make use of civil law.").
285 Galaz, supra note 274, at 427.
286 Id. at 428.
287 Id. at 427.
92
Neither the WUA nor judicial system offers indigent water users a realistic forum
for dispute resolution. Given the restricted membership, internal politics disfavoring
certain water right holders in WUA, and the internal problems - slow resolution,
unpredictability - and external problems - cost and individual perception of the judicial
system - most "violations are not reported by a majority oflow-income citizens.,,288
Consequently, the Chilean water law has created a management scheme that presents
fundamental socioeconomic concern in regards to conflict resolution.
Weak Governing Agency
The Water Code created WUA to fill in the gaps that resulted from decentralizing
water management and establishing the DGA as merely an administrative and technical
agency. Water agencies with strong centralized powers are capable of overseeing water
rights, ensuring regulation, and even adjudicating water disputes. However, the DGA is
unable to perfonn any of these legal duties. One important function that the DGA does
perfonn, in light of climate change, is measuring and detennining the availability of
water resources?89 However, much more is required of an agency in a changing climate,
particularly if the goal is to respond to these changes in an ethical manner.
For instance, one key area of freshwater resource management that needs to be
strengthened before greater hydrological changes is a better management during periods
288 JORGE CORREA SUTIL & MARIA ANGELICA JIMENEZ, SISTEMA JUDICIAL YPOBREZA-EsTUDIO SOBRE EL
ACCESSO ALA JUSTICIA EN ARGENTINA, CHILE, PERU YVENEZUELA 46 (1997) (emphasis in original).
289 Fija Texto del Codigo de Aguas, art. 299 (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Numero 1.122).
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of drought. Recall that under drought conditions the Water Code allows for water rights
holders to first attempt to redistribute water among themselves before the DGA has
authority to distribute water resources.290 As climate change reduces the availability of
water, the redistribution process among water rights holders could become more
contested as stakeholders are competing for fewer resources. However, water rights
holders may have greater incentive to reach an amicable allocation of water in times of
drought in order to preclude the DGA from stepping in and allocating water resources for
the public use. Ethical implications arise when private rights holders are able to allocate
water resources without the public interest being protected.
Coordinating Multiple Users and Absence ofa Priority System
The lack of coordinating multiple users in a riparian system is not, by itself, an
ethical concern. The ethical problem arises in the Chilean management scheme because
the absence of a priority system is coupled with the privatization of water rights, a free
market enterprise, and the severance of water from land rights. The Water Code also
fails to efficiently manage multiple water users. The inability to administer competing
water uses and needs ultimately leads to ethical dilemmas as the market system excludes
those who do not have the capital to participate. One means to balance the needs and
demands of various stakeholders is to establish a priority system. A priority system can
regulate which users have superior claim to water, such as the prior appropriation
290/d. art. 314.
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doctrine used by western states in the United States, using the "first in time, first in line"
principle. A priority system can also be enforced during times of shortage.29I .
One drawback to a priority system is that "it can freeze existing uses that no
longer reflect changing societal values and the importance of aquatic ecosystems.,,292 For
instance, the priority system under the prior appropriation model in the western United
States has frozen some senior uses where the use is of low-value. This is problematic in
that it can "inhibit or prevent the transfer of water from lower- to higher-value uses.,,293
A priority system does not need to be modeled after prior appropriation where particular
users are given seniority. Rather, an ethical framework can decide which categories of
use should receive priority over other lower-value uses. Currently, Chile's Water Code
does not employ any priority system and instead leaves priority to be determined by
water rights holders through the free market.
Severance ofLand and Water
The severance of water rights from land rights has been an important component
in the disproportional access to water rights in Chile. Decoupling land and water rights
can be beneficial by permitting water to be transported to areas or populations in the
greatest need without legal barriers, which can promote an ethical approach to water
291 See AM. SOC'Y OF CIVIL ENG'RS, REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE, ASCE/EWRI § 6R-3-04
(1997).
292 Adler, supra note 272, at 24.
293 Id. at 25.
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management. Severance of land and water therefore may be an important component to
freshwater resource management for climate change since flexibility and transferability
will be increasingly important.
However, severance of water and land does not assure that water will in fact be
transported to regions with the highest need. Furthermore, in Chile decoupling plus
absolute ownership over water rights has lead to the intrusion of new stakeholders into
communities with water but without capital. As Boelens describes, "[d]ecoupling water
rights from their territory or community opens the door for scenarios in which local
communities are confronted with new, nonlocal water interest sectors and powerful
enterprises.,,294 This decoupling is particularly problematic where large water consuming
companies, like mining or bottling companies, are able to move into a community and
buy water rights even though those waters might flow through the community's land.
Absolute Private Ownership
In the process of acquiring and using a right, water rights holders have no
limitation on how that water can be used. In other words, the ethical concern is that
rights holders do not have to use water productively or even efficiently to maintain their
right. For example, if a mining company makes an application for a water right,
according to the Water Code, the company is not required to justify or explain how they
will use the requested water. When the right is obtained, there are no legal requirements
294 Boelens, supra note 279, at 110.
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that the mining company must actually use that right, which in tum can lead to
speculation and water hoarding. Scholars have noted that this "tendency of concentrating
water rights in the hands of a few commercial companies can be noted with the
development of mining activities in the dry northern region.,,295 Although the 2005
policy reforms tried to address speculation by imposing a tax on unused water, a tax may
not serve as enough of a deterrent. Rights holders that likely to engage in water hoarding
or speculation may be able to afford the tax. In addition, according to a cost-benefit
analysis, the increase cost in hoarding rights may be worth the additional cost to assure
water availability, particularly with water scarcity as a growing concern.
Not only is speculation a concern under the Water Code, but also the code does
not require rights holders to use water in a beneficial manner. Under the prior
appropriation model, users are required to put water to a "beneficial use." The rationale
behind this policy is that water is a finite resource and societies will benefit more if users
put water rights to a productive use versus water being wasted. The concept of what
qualifies as "beneficial use" is ambiguous and is defined differently by each state that
uses the prior appropriation model. In Chile, however, if a mining company wanted to
use their water right to engage in wasteful activities, such as using water to exterminate
vermin, they can and no governing body could cancel their rights for doing so.296 A
beneficial use doctrine would encumber the absolute private ownership established by
295 !d. at 111 (citing to Jan Hendriks, Water as Private Property: Notes on the Case ojChile, in SEARCHING
FOR EQUITY 308 (Robert Boelens & Gloria Davila eds., 1998)).
296 This example is a play on the famous water law case in which California's Supreme Court is trying to
determine whether an alfalfa farmer was putting his water to beneficial use when using water to kill
gophers. Tulare Irrigation Dist. V. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal. 1935).
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Chile's Water Code and require a constitutional amendment. Nevertheless, the doctrine
would be a means to ensure protection ofthe public's interest in water and because
"beneficial use" can be defined by diverse social norms, this doctrine could thus also
serve as a means to protect local and cultural values in water resources. The key in
constructing an ethical framework utilizing the beneficial use doctrine, however, would
be to ensure "beneficial use" be culturally defined.
Chile does not impose a beneficial use requirement on water rights because
holders enjoy an absolute ownership of water. Absolute ownership also allows holders to
change the use of their water right. Water management models that prohibit a user from
changing water do so in order to protect the interest of third parties. In the Chilean
model, even though the code does not expressly prohibit a change in use, how a water
right is defined by the code (e.g. consumptive versus non-consumptive and continuous,
discontinuous, or alternating) somewhat limits the water use to the extent where a drastic
change in use is not a concern. For instance, a hydroelectric company that has a
continuous non-consumptive use cannot suddenly switch from using water for
hydropower to agriculture, which is a consumptive use of water, as this change would
violate the scope oftheir water right. However, the definition of a water right does not
preclude a rights holder from selling, transferring, renting, or leasing a water right to
another individual, which then allows a change in the nature of how that water is put to
use.
A flexible change in use policy, like the one in Chile, is necessary for an ethical
framework for water resource management. This is because a flexible and liberal change
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in water use water policy is beneficial for two reasons. First, many traditional Andean
communities freely exchange water as part of cultural traditions. Historically, these
communities socially, rather then economically, transferred and exchanged water rights
to maintain a network of friends and relatives; likewise, a community's identity might
have been constructed around the struggle against landlords and water and land rights;
communities have also benefit from water transfers by consolidating identities and
togetherness through years of collaborative water management and building water
infrastructure.297 Second, any nation or community trying to respond to changing
hydrological patterns due to climate change will benefit from the flexibility and adaptive
character of changing water uses.
Diminished Collective Management
Chile's amalgamation oflegal principles has engendered a system where
individuals are much less likely to collaborate over water resource decisions and
conflicts, and instead, individuals are more likely make decisions based upon
protectionist measures and turning profit. For instance:
",[In] valleys and oases ofthe North Chilean desert where the scarcity of water
could, in principle, be expected to induce a well-organized and quite solid
organization, collective systems of operation and investments have either severely
eroded or stopped to exist. Farmers are claiming their individual rights, but
collective control is vanishing, and general assemblies and community decision
ak' d' 298m mg lsappear.
297 Boelens, supra note 279, at 109.
298 1d. at 112-13.
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The availability of water resources are diminishing because the free-market system
incites fierce competition among rights holders rather then collective management. As
one author explains:
[T]he current policy does not foster interuser collaboration and local-level
resolution of rights-related conflicts. On the contrary, the policy provokes and
generates tensions, and severely undermines existing collective arrangements to
deal with and settle conflicts. Intrasystem rights, which formerly were rooted in
localized normative systems and strongly embedded in local intuitions and social
networks, are now eroded through their increased dependence on market and on
state legislation.299
Once local interest in collective water management vanishes, a chain reaction occurs
throughout the communities. For example, water rights holders with little economic or
political power, like low-income farmers, are less interested in investing in a system
where there is no collective assurance and there is no protection against an outsider, like a
mining company, acquiring a right to the detriment of the farmer. As Boelens succinctly
summarized, "the more individual owners of water, the fewer owners of the system.,,300
The Water Code has created a number of other ethical problems, many of which
cannot be adequately explored in this short analysis. For instance, the Water Code
contains no instream flow provisions, which are important to preserve riparian
ecosystems and prevent the DGA from allocating every last drop of water to users. An
ethical framework will not only address the human needs of water, but will also address
environmental needs since a healthy ecosystem is a prerequisite to clean water.
Additionally, an ethical framework should explore ways to govern groundwater and
299 Id. at 112.
300 Hendriks, supra note 296, 306.
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surface water as one system through "conjunctive management.,,301 Although these
hydrological systems are connected, water management models govern them separately.
These few issues, among numerous others, are ripe for further study in order to determine
how they might be best structured for an ethical management of freshwater resources.
Drawing from the legal analysis and case studies of Chile, two broad principles
can be summarized regarding the ethical management of water resources that can be
applied to any conversation about water ethics. Keeping in line with earlier criticisms
about a universal ethic, neither of these principles risks homogenizing cultural values.
First, the Chilean Water Code de1inks water from culture by pushing a universal water
management structure. Consequently, populations who are unable to or consciously
resist assimilation experience great inequity in access to water. Second, the inherent
public nature of water precludes the absolute ownership of water. Naturally, then, when
a public good is legally defined as an economic commodity, ethical problems ensue.
301 Conjunctive management is a "program [that] coordinates the use of groundwater and surface water."
Ruth Langridge, Confronting Drought: Water Supply Planning and the Establishment ofa Strategic
Groundwater Reserve, 12 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 295,316 (2009).
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CHAPTER VII
THE RISKS OF A UNIVERSAL NORMATIVE AUTHORITY GOVERNING
FRESHWATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The purpose of this thesis is not to isolate Chile's Water Code as the precedent of
how not to ethically manage water resources. Rather, this thesis aims to extract general
ethical dilemmas from Chile's paradigm that may resonate with other freshwater
resources management models in order to contribute to future public policy decisions
regarding freshwater management. To accomplish this goal, this final chapter shifts the
discussion of ethical concerns of water resource management away from the near
scientific and detailed analysis of Chile's water laws to a discussion of formal
institutions, agents, and implementation of water management. The result is a discussion
that conceptualizes ethical concerns of national water management paradigms in terms of
discursive and political powers.
The goal of this chapter is therefore two-fold. First, it is to explain why Chilean
water policies are incongruent with ethical principles from a normative perspective.
Second, this chapter ties together legal principles of ethical freshwater management with
cultural norms so as to promote ethical doctrines of management.
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Water Resource Management Discourse
Although water laws are about managing a natural resource, water laws are
equally about shaping human behavior in regards to water. Because water is a critical
component ofhuman lives and experiences, water laws also shape human behavior in
general. Those who are in a position to create and enforce water laws are ultimately
constructing a paradigm that is both inclusive and exclusive by determining such things
as who has access, who has a legally recognized interest, and what uses are given
priority. Water laws are thus, on one level, about power. By defining who can and
cannot have water, water laws are capable of denying claims to water rights. In Chile, as
in so many other countries around the world, the government creates the laws and
procedures to allocate water rights. When water laws are constructed under a universal
norm, water users are perceived and therefore treated as homogenous. A universalist
vision of water resource management "erase[s] normative differences altogether.,,302 As
a result, universal water laws can fail to incorporate diverse concepts and values of water,
especially if those diverse uses do not coincide with norms promoted in the paradigm or
policies. In Chile, an example of water user homogenization is seen in the comparison
the indigenous communities to mining companies. Both are treated equally under the
1981 Water Code although their water needs and demands are drastically different.
Whether the intentional or not on the government's behalf, forcing various normative
302 Paul Schiff Bennan, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 1155, 1189 (2007).
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orders to operate under a universal paradigm denies the existing "diverse management
approaches and socio-1ega1 repertoires for regulation of water control.,,303
Water laws construct and promote a particular vision about national culture,
particularly when those laws impose only an official norm. For Chile, that norm is that
economics dictate water use, which is a politically contrived norm that was constructed as
a response to the failure of Chile's second Water Code of 1967. These laws then,
because they guide human behavior and, as illustrated through the case studies, impact
cultural survival, are very influential tools to promote a national culture and a political
agenda set forth by a sovereign entity. According to sociologist Stuart Hall, who studied
cultural theory, "[t]he formation of a national culture...generalized a single vernacular
language as the dominant medium of communication throughout the nation, created a
homogenous culture and maintained national cultural institutions.,,304 Consequently,
Chile's national paradigm is the main authority on water resource management not only
because they are backed by formal sovereign power, but the Chilean Water Code also
promotes a concept which produces meaning.
A water regime promoting only one water culture norm maintains legitimacy, and
therefore power, through defining water rights which inevitably excludes certain users
and uses of water. In Chile, those excluded are the indigent and other disadvantaged
groups. Once forma11ega1 processes define social and cultural norms, the universal water
303 Rutgerd Boelens et a1., Special Law - Recognition and Denial ofDiversity in Andean Water Control, in
LIQUID RELATIONS: CONTESTED WATER RIGHTS AND LEGAL COMPLEXITY 146 (Dik Roth et a1. eds., 2005).
304 Stuart Hall, The Questions ofCultural Identity, in MODERNITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN
SOCJETIES 612 (Stuart Hall et a1. eds., 1996).
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paradigm is then able to maintain fonnallegitimacy by creating and perpetuating a
powerful myth about legal superiority that penalizes communities that do not fit within
that discourse. Communities that harbor nonns different then those imposed by the water
resource management paradigm are excluded because the universal approach to water
management is presented in tenns of truths that ignore diverse water culture nonns.
Boelens critiques this aspect of the Chilean Water Code when he wrote, "[n]eoliberal
thinking refers to universal and natural truths about how water and money flow, and
about how humans behave. Rather than being rooted in local specificity, it preaches that
water management should be based on universal and global truths.,,305
While diverse nonns are no less valid then the universal nonn, the diverse nonns
simply are not legitimized by the sovereign's fonnallegal processes. Denying diversity,
which is the process of exclusion, is then perpetuated is by myth that the universal water
resource paradigm is "'modem,' 'efficient,' and [a] 'rational' [mode of] management.,,306
Imposing a legal regime that embodies only one water culture nonn upon the diverse
communities that compose a nation presupposes that all water users have identical needs
and demands. The Chilean Water Code very much assumes that all users will display the
same behavior, a concept that is rooted in the Enlightenment tradition:
An important belief that fuels new water policies is that the behavior of water
users and managers follows incentives that are largely detennined in institutions
and markets. The outcome of organizational and political processes in water
305 Rutgerd Boelens & Margreet Zwarteveen, Anomalous Water Rights and the Politics ofNormalization:
Collective Water Control and Privatization Policies in the Andean Region, in LIQUID RELATIONS:
CONTESTED WATER RIGHTS AND LEGAL COMPLEXITY 107 (Dik Roth et al. eds., 2005).
306 Boelens, supra note 304, at 146.
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management are seen as the sum of rational decisions made by individuals, based
on interests which can be objectively defined and known by outside analyst.307
The process of managing freshwater resources under one paradigm requires everyone to
have a similar relationship to water, which thereby constructs an "imagined
community.,,308 As a result, water users become homogenized just like the law itself
because everyone is treated uniformly.
Users who have different values and norms in regards to water than the universal
sovereign supported regime, for instance those who value water for something other then
its economic worth, must adapt to the sovereign's norms or risk having no legally
legitimate claim to water. Framed differently, diverse water cultural norms must
assimilate to the universal paradigm for water resource management. Resisting
assimilation brings labeling. For instance, communities like campesinos or indigenous
groups that attempt to maintain traditional use or management of water may be perceived
as "backward," "inefficient," or "antiquated," labels that project opposing values of
Chile's water regimes. In addition, these labels perpetuate the myth that a universal
approach to water management is the best or most appropriate means to natural resource
management.
307 Boelens, supra note 306, at 105,
308 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF
NATIONALISM 6 (1991); see also, Hall, supra note 305, at 613 (discussing the construction of a national
identities is an "imagined community").
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The greatest myth perpetuated by Chile's water model is the concept of equity.309
The argument that Chile's Water Code promotes equality goes something like the
following: under a centralized management ofwater resources, every individual has an
equal opportunity to participate in the system and everyone is treated the same as the
code does not differentiate between users. Those that choose not to participate in the
market do so on their own accord. Treating individuals as equal, however, erases
diverging social and cultural meanings tied to water. According to Boelens, the equality
myth is both extremely effective at promoting a universal norm and simultaneously
detrimental to traditional communities:
This ideology delegitimizes water management according to autonomous local
norms and organizations. Problems of water distribution that are grounded in
ethnic identities and social relations thus get reduced to mere questions of
inclusion and exclusion. Consequently, it is often concluded that occurring
problems are caused by the indigenous and peasant communities' backwardness
and lack of access to official legislation, since these population groups are fixed to
their traditional water management systems and lack modern inputs and
education... [T]hey are considered marginalized and excluded from the general
normative system, and consequently from social benefits of national society.310
While the Water Code proclaims to treat individuals equally, private ownership of water
rights institutionalizes social differentiations and inequality.
309 See Boelens, supra note 306, at 118 (discussing that the assumption of equality "is crucial, since markets
and meetings only function when all participants can interact as equals.").
310 Boelens, supra note 304, at 147.
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The Contested Nature o/Water Rights and Ethical Solutions
Analyzing the ethical implications of freshwater management emphasizes a few
important points that are worth reiterating. First, because water is a natural resource
essential for life, politics and water cannot be divorced from one another and water
resource management will never truly be objective or neutral. This is not necessarily a
bad thing so long as water resource management is a balanced and equitable process. But
the political nature of freshwater resource management can be problematic because, as
one author points out, "[s]ome (groups of) people are better situated than others to secure
access to water, to control water resources, and to determine water discourse.,,31l To
ensure that groups are not abusing power differences, an ethical framework requires those
who are better situated to recognize power differentials between users and strive to
ensure equality across stakeholders.
Second, water laws are as much about managing natural resources as they are
about defining social and cultural relationships: "At any location and in any point in time,
existing repertories of water rights and laws are expressions of, and dialectically
constitute, social and economic relationships between people. Therefore, proposed
changes in such laws and rights always entail changes in these socioeconomic
relationships.,,312 An ethical framework moves this process forward as it conceptualizes
social and cultural norms.
311 Margreet Zwarteveen et al., Water Rights and Legal Pluralism: Beyond Analysis and Recognition, in
LIQUID RELATIONS: CONTESTED WATER RIGHTS AND LEGAL COMPLEXITY 257 (Dik Roth et al. eds., 2005).
312 Id.
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In the concluding remarks of the book Liquid Relations, the authors discuss the
four ways in which water rights are contested. A legal framework that incorporates
considerations about water ethics will carefully and honestly examine each of these
points of contest because these four areas are the same areas where water ethics are
lacking. First, water rights are contested "because they deal with decisions about the
distribution and allocation of a very important resource.,,313 Second, is the contest "over
the contents of rules, norms, and laws that determine water distribution and
allocation.,,314 "A third way in which water rights are contested relates to struggles over
who decides about questions of water distri\mtion.,,315 The final "area of contestation lies
in the discourses used to articulate water problems and solutions.,,316 Ethical solutions to
these areas of contest should have the overall goal ofpromoting diversity and pluralism
in a way that does not simply insert marginalized populations into bureaucratic or
standardized management norms, but in a manner that also promotes empowerment.
There are many strategies for an ethical reform. These suggestions, however,
only address procedural processes as substantive ethical reforms must be defined by the
communities themselves. The ethical procedural recommendations are:
Identification of interest groups, analysis of problems, needs, and potential assets
ofleast favored groups, interactive action research, facilitation of networks and
horizontal linkages (alliance-building capacity), facilitation ofnegotiation forums
313 ld.
314 ld.
315 ld. at 258.
316 ld.
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accessible to the least powerful groups, preparing them (demand- and proposal-
making capacity), and institutional backing in these platforms ....317
A clearer or more defined solution cannot be given because an ethical approach to water
management ultimately draws upon local cultural and social norms. Creating a universal
water ethic or a list of ethical legal provisions for governments to adopt and enforce
would be perpetuating the process of normalization and power that this thesis strongly
argues against.
Debating a Pluralist Paradigm ofFreshwater Resource Management
Because Chile's water laws are incongruent with communities' relationship with
water, the socio-political environment in Chile is ripe for resistance or struggle. The
severity and amount of resistance will only increase as climate change alters hydrological
systems and makes water resources even scarcer. Governments or legislators, when
confronted by the possibility of civil society fracturing and resisting law, are likely to
reform laws or add new legislation to address the source of the dissidence since resistance
causes law to lose legitimacy. What has developed from this civil unrest in Chile are
laws that address customary or traditional needs and are legitimized by national
institutions. The Indigenous Law is one such law.
The recent Chilean Supreme Court decision that used the Indigenous Law to
protect water for the Aymara people can be viewed as an example of a pluralist approach
317Id. at 266.
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achieving a more ethical solution to current and future water supply shortages.
Nonetheless, there are valid criticisms regarding the proposal that a hybrid legal
framework is a viable solution to fix current water policies. First, a pluralist model is
impractical to administer. Prior to the recent Supreme Court decision regarding the
Aymara's water rights, one scholar denounced the Indigenous Law as a "dead letier,,,318
existing only on paper but not in practice. However, the Supreme Court decision
breathed life into the law and created a Water Code with pluralist legal spaces.
Nevertheless, to enforce the law and coordinate the overlapping and contradictory nature
of pluralist legislation, that is the Water Code versus Indigenous Law, required judicial
activism. For the Aymara, it took the Supreme Court to harmonize the two pieces of
legislation. Fortunately, the current Chilean Supreme Court favors environmental laws
and is known to use pre-existing legal principles to protect the environment,319 Yet,
having a favorable Supreme Court is not a long-term legal solution to the ethical concerns
embedded in Chile's water model since the majority of cases never reach the Supreme
Court, and the priorities ofthe Court can shift with the Court's composition.
A second criticism in promoting a pluralist legislation model to address ethical
concerns is that supplemental laws only fill the ethical gaps created by the universal
water model. In other words, the Indigenous Law is not a solution to the disparate
impacts ofprivatized water in Chile, but instead a ruse granting indigenous people no
318 Boelens, supra note 304, at 161.
319 David Aronofsky, Professor, University of Montana School of Law, Address at the Public Interest
Environmental Law Conference 20 10: Unnecessary Risks and Unnecessary Dams: Patagonia's Wilder
Rivers Under Siege (Feb. 27,2010).
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more power or autonomy over water management then they had before the law was
enacted. Additionally, the Indigenous Law is not a solution for all the populations
disproportionately impacted by the Water Code. For instance, poor fanners have no legal
remedies or protection under the Indigenous Law. The only way to address the other
communities affected by the code is to pass legislation for those specific communities.
However, this presents a larger problem. If legislators simply draft new laws to fill gaps
in ethical management without actually ever refonning the code itself, the Water Code
would lose legitimacy and be rendered valueless if too many dual laws exist. And lastly,
the Indigenous Law is a "concept of 'indigenousness' and disregards the dynamic nature
of identity, local rights systems... and cultural diversity.,,32o In other words, the
Indigenous Law is a neoliberal construction of indigenous water rights, not a self-
defining indigenous model of water resource management. To truly be an ethical
framework, disadvantaged populations need to be part of the legislative process.
Third, the inability of this framework to produce a definitive list of solutions may
be disconcerting to policy- and decision-makers. Yet, the source of this discomfort is the
root ofthe ethical dilemmas. The discomfort arises from the inability to completely
control and regulate water uses, or in other words, discomfort arises from the
relinquishment of power. A central principle of water laws is to manage the natural
resource in the most efficient and predictable means, and thus, not having a defined list of
policies seemingly frustrates these two objectives. Remember, however, that climate
change is going to change hydrological patterns in very locally specific ways. Allowing
320 Boelens, supra note 304, at 159-60.
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local communities to have a voice in water management, therefore, may be more efficient
in the long term.
Fourth, if an ethical model is not carefully constructed with the consent and
participation of various communities and stakeholders, then an ethical framework can
easily become a political tool to manage rather than incorporate the water needs of
disadvantaged populations. In other words, the concept ofwater ethics would only exist
in de jure as "equitable rules do not necessarily lead to equitable practice.,,321 Take, for
instance, Chile's Indigenous Law. Before the Supreme Court enforced the water rights
enumerated by that law, the water rights were de jure. Following the Supreme Court's
ruling, the water rights turned de facto. And fifth, an ethical framework that strives to
increase access and control for disadvantaged populations will increase the number of
legitimized claims to water. This approach may in turn lead to greater conflict as the
framework would increase and diversify the stakeholders and introduce pluralist
regulations that are incapable of interacting with one another.
As with current water models in effect, an ethical framework to manage
freshwater resources will not be without its own complications and shortcomings. Since
water is a contested resource, there will never be a perfect solution or a solution that all
parties agree upon. Just because there are formidable challenges and hurdles to
reforming water legislation to adapt to our changing climate and ethical concerns, does
not mean these hurdles are barriers. To deny an ethical approach, or even ignore the
obvious ethical dilemmas water management faces due to a changing climate thereby
321 Rutgerd Boelens, Equity and Rule-making, in SEARCHING FOR EQUITY: CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE AND
EQUITY IN PEASANT IRRIGATION 30 (Rutgerd Boelens & Gloria Davila eds., 1998).
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maintaining the status quo power dynamics is a moral response in itself, and perhaps the
moral response that we do not want to be associated with.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
Constructing an Ethical Framework
Because an ethical framework derives its policies from context-specific and
sociocultural norms, I am unable to produce a definitive list of substantive policies.
Instead, the communities regulated by substantive policies must construct their own legal
framework. I am, however, able to recommend generalizable principles and procedural
mechanisms to ensure an ethical approach to freshwater resource management.
First, legal entities cannot have absolute dominion over freshwater resources. I
am not advocating that all water resources must be managed as a public property in order
to be ethical. Contrary, water should be available for private ownership still but
limitations must be placed on those private rights so as sociocultural norms evolve and
water availability changes, political entities will be able to recall those rights for the
public good.
Second, an ethical framework must conjunctively manage surface and
groundwater systems. Even though surface and groundwater are interconnected
resources, current water management models regulate their uses separately and
differently. In order for communities and political entities to make socially responsible
water resource decisions, such decisions must consider both sources of water. For
instance, it make very little sense to allow a private water bottling company to deplete
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groundwater sources when water from that aquifer feeds into springs and rivers and is
used by communities for drinking, agriculture, and energy. Third, water resources should
be managed on smaller jurisdictional scales. Because climate change will impact
hydrological patterns differently from region to region and because water ethics are often
tied to place, managing water resources by basins will allow communities and political
entities to make management decisions that best reflect their specific needs.
Fourth, an ethical framework needs to establish priorities. There needs to be both
a meta-level priority system and also basin level priority systems. A priority system
should avoid locking in water uses indefinitely as responding to the hydrological effects
of climate change requires a high degree of flexibility. Fifth, water management models
must include strong procedural safeguards to ensure equal access to information, civil
participation, and transparency. Strong procedural rights will include robust conflict
resolution services, institutions specializing in cross-culture communication, and
processes for requesting a water right that account for third party harms, the public
interest, and environmental protection.
The Benefits Derived From an Ethical Framework
Constructing an ethical framework will require resources, dedication, and
perseverance because such comprehensive water policy reforms will incite a strong
opposition. Nevertheless, the potential benefits of an ethical framework far outweigh
these common legislative obstacles. For instance, an ethical framework will enhance
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collective management because each community will be allowed to prioritize uses and
define water needs. An ethical framework accommodates the multitude of claims to
water and how these claims overlap one another, and consequently, an ethical framework
is a more accurate and realistic understanding of the choices water users face.
Additionally, because divergent water ethics are often at the core of water
conflicts, an ethical framework will reduce escalating conflict in a changing climate. I
am not suggesting that an ethical framework will eliminate or preclude conflict, but rather
I propose that an ethical framework will allow for conflict resolution to occur outside the
traditional litigation approach. Using alternative modes of dispute resolution may also
lead to settling disputes that would not traditionally be litigated and may resolve
disagreements before they escalate.
An ethical framework also promotes the holistic management of water resources.
Managing water resources on a smaller jurisdictional scale allows for very context-
specific decision-making, and thus, an ethical framework presents an opportunity to
conjunctively manage surface and groundwater resources. In addition, an ethical
framework promotes cultural survival by fostering diverse water norms tied to
sociocultural practices. Lastly, an ethical framework enables adaptive responses to
uncertainties. These uncertainties exist in climate change, altering hydrological patterns,
economic stability, political and social structures, and even cultural identity. In an era of
vast uncertainties, legal models must be adaptable otherwise changes resulting from these
uncertainties can render the model obsolete.
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Concluding Remarks
The world is facing water crisis. Water is a valuable and exhaustible resource, but
a resource that humans often treat as expendable and inexhaustible.322 Legal regimes
managing water resources are under considerable stress to allocate water resources and
resolve conflicts in a rapidly growing and consumptive world. Global climate change
will exert further pressure on these legal regimes to respond to and resolve problems
caused by changes in hydrological patterns. Sovereigns and policymakers are obligated
to respond to the water needs of society using the legal frameworks that are in place.
However, if those legal frameworks do not address ethical concerns about water
management, then any response to water management will have resounding ethical
implications. Prevailing laws and regulations governing freshwater resources are not
constructed to account for issues of equality or justice. The additional stress of climate
change will only exacerbate the ethical conundrums of water resource management.
Water policy reforms for climate change must account for ethical dilemmas not only for
moral reasons but also to minimize conflict and ensure the stability of future civil society.
Currently, there is no ethical framework for managing freshwater resources.
Scholarship in this field is beginning to explore several core principles that could be used
to develop a universal ethic on freshwater management, but this is a very dangerous
proposition as it risks eliminating the diverse and unique cultural values embedded in
water. Losing these values leads to the loss of traditions, identity, and a way oflife. A
universal ethic is also undesirable because it will inadvertently lead to greater conflict by
322 ROBERT GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA'S WATER CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 17 (2009).
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delegitimizing water norms. Adapting water resource legal regimes to climate change
will require its own set of considerations such as strengthening conservation measures,
efficiency, and the transferability ofwater. Adapting water resource legal regimes to
ethically respond to climate change necessitates its own considerations such as
accounting for and legitimizing plural cultural and social values of water.
Water ethics is truly in its infancy as a field, and consequently, there is extensive
work that can be done on this topic. Moreover, this thesis raises as many questions about
water ethics as it provides answers. Thus, there are many research questions to explore
using this thesis as a beginning point. For example, a next appropriate project could
begin to formulate concrete procedural mechanisms to promote an ethical framework and
look for case studies of such mechanisms in effect. Water ethics research should also
examine what other segments of society are marginalized besides indigenous
communities and peasants and explore why and how these populations are impacted.
On a final note, I urge legislators and policymakers worldwide to be proactive in
thinking about water policy reform and ethical issues, and most of all, to use common
sense. Water is a precious resource and must be treated as such despite legislation
allowing water rights holders to waste it. Before water shortages reach catastrophic
levels and we become further entrenched in our current inequitable and wasteful
practices, water policy reforms must manage water as a valuable but exhaustible public
resource.
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